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This paper assesses empirically the effects of oil price shocks on the real economic activity of the main
industrialised countries. Multivariate VAR analysis is carried out using both linear and non-linear models.
The latter category includes three approaches employed in the literature, namely, the asymmetric, scaled
and net specifications. We find evidence of a non-linear impact of oil prices on real GDP. In particular, oil
price increases are found to have an impact on GDP growth of a larger magnitude than that of oil price
price increases are found to have a negative impact on economic activity in all cases but Japan. Moreover,
the effect of oil shocks on GDP growth differs between the two oil exporting countries in our sample, with
oil price increases affecting the UK negatively and Norway positively.
declines, with the latter being statistically insignificant in most cases. Among oil importing countries, oil
Keywords: Macroeconomic fluctuations; Oil price shock; Non-linear models.
JEL codes: E32, Q43.Non-technical summary
The present paper assesses empirically the eﬀects of oil price shocks on the real economic activity
of the main industrialised OECD countries (individual G-7 countries, Norway and the euro area as a
whole). The wide spectrum of countries included stands in contrast with most of the empirical literature
on the subject which has focused on the US economy. While our sample of countries consists mostly of
oil importing economies, we also analyse OECD’s two main oil exporting countries.
In order to pursue our study, we carry out multivariate vector autoregressions. In doing so, we
consider the leading approaches employed in the empirical literature, estimating both linear and non-
linear models. Until the mid-1980s econometric studies on the subject used to estimate linear models
linking oil prices and real activity. At that point in time such linear relationship began to lose signiﬁcance.
In fact, the declines in oil prices occurred over the second half of the 1980s were found to have smaller
positive eﬀects on economic activity than predicted by linear models. Thus, some authors introduced
non-linear transformations of oil prices to re-establish the negative relationship between increases in oil
prices and economic downturns. In this paper, we consider the three main non-linear approaches used in
the literature, namely, the asymmetric, scaled and net speciﬁcations.
The main ﬁndings of this paper may be summarised as follows. As a ﬁrst step, our use of Granger
causality-type tests allows us to conclude that the interaction between oil prices and macroeconomic
variables is found to be signiﬁcant, with the direction of causality going in at least one direction in all
countries, and in both directions in most countries. The eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei no i lp r i c e so nr e a lG D P
growth are found to diﬀer substantially from those of an oil price decrease, providing evidence against
the linear approach that assumes that oil prices have symmetric eﬀects on the real economy.
We investigate this comparison between diﬀerent models further in the paper. The results show that
there is evidence of a non-linear impact of oil prices on real GDP growth in both oil importing and
exporting countries. We ﬁnd that one of the non-linear models, namely the scaled speciﬁcation, performs
somewhat better than the other models. The scaled model has two important characteristics. First, it
shares with the asymmetric model the notion that a given oil price increase may have an impact on real
GDP which is diﬀerent from that of an oil price fall of the same magnitude. Moreover, it involves a
transformation of the oil price that standardises the estimated residuals of the autoregressive model by
its time-varying (conditional) variability. This transformation seems very plausible in light of the pattern
of oil price changes over time, with most changes being rather small and being punctuated by occasional
sizeable shocks. The good performance of the scaled model indicates that, for the analysis of output
growth, it is important to consider the environment in which oil price changes take place, highlighting in
particular that a given oil price change has a larger impact in a context of previously stable prices than
in one of volatile market behaviour. Moreover, as with the asymmetric model, the scaled speciﬁcation
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an impact on GDP growth of a larger magnitude than that of oil price declines, with the latter being
statistically insigniﬁcant in most cases.
Given that the scaled speciﬁcation appears to dominate competing models in terms of standard
measures of goodness of ﬁt, we focus on this approach when describing our econometric results. Moreover,
we distinguish between oil importing and exporting countries as the results are expected to diﬀerent
depending on the type of country under consideration. We ﬁnd that an increase in oil prices has a
signiﬁcant negative impact on the GDP growth in all oil importing countries but Japan. In the latter
country, the model fails to identify any negative real eﬀect of oil prices, possibly due to the special
circumstances undergone by the Japanese economy. This unexpected result, however, is not robust to
changes in the lag speciﬁcation. In addition, the eﬀects of an oil price hike on GDP growth are overall
strongest for the US, although euro area countries (Germany, France and Italy) exhibit similarly strong
real eﬀects when we use non-linear modelling. In these cases, we ﬁnd that a decline in oil prices aﬀects
signiﬁcantly only a few countries, having a positive impact on the US and UK economies while doing
harm to the Canadian economy. The latter result can be explained by the fact that large decreases in oil
prices took place after the early 1980s, which is when Canada was switching from a net oil importer into
a net oil exporter. With regard to the two oil exporting countries in our sample, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
oil shocks on GDP growth diﬀer. Oil prices are found to aﬀect positively Norwegian GDP growth, while
having a negative impact on oil exporter UK’s economic activity (relating to the standard Dutch disease
eﬀect).
As far as the size of the responses is concerned, non-linear speciﬁcations tend to yield larger real
impacts of oil price shocks compared with the linear model. For the sake of concreteness, let us focus
on the preferred (scaled) speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that in the US the output loss resulting from a 100% oil
price hike increases from around 3.5% in the linear approach to 5% in the scaled case. Among the other
oil importing countries, the respective increase in the output loss arising from the same shock is from
around 2% to a range of 3 to 5% in the case of individual euro area countries, from less than 1% to 2%
in the case of the euro area as a whole, and from very small values to around 1% in Canada. Among the
oil exporters in our sample, in the UK the corresponding rise in the output loss from the same shock is
from less than 2% to over 2%, while in Norway the output gain increases from 1% to more than 2%.
We also pursue variance decomposition analysis, which suggests that oil price shocks are a considerable
source of volatility for many of the variables in the model. For real GDP, oil prices shocks are together
with monetary shocks the largest source of variation other than the variable itself for most of the countries.
Finally, we do not ﬁnd evidence of instability of the oil price coeﬃcients of the GDP equation in any
model with the exception of the linear speciﬁcation for the euro area.
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A large body of research suggests that oil price ﬂuctuations have considerable consequences on
economic activity. These consequences are expected to be diﬀerent in oil importing and in oil exporting
countries. Whereas an oil price increase should be considered good news in oil exporting countries and
bad news in oil importing countries, the reverse should be expected when the oil price decreases.1 The
transmission mechanisms through which oil prices have an impact on real economic activity include both
supply and demand channels.2 The supply side eﬀects are related to the fact that crude oil is a basic input
to production, and consequently an increase in oil price leads to a rise in production costs that induces
ﬁrms to lower output. Oil prices changes also entail demand-side eﬀects on consumption and investment.
Consumption is aﬀected indirectly through its positive relation with disposable income. The magnitude
of this eﬀect is in turn stronger the more the shock is perceived to be long-lasting. Moreover, oil prices
have an adverse impact on investment by increasing ﬁrms’ costs. It is worth noting that, in addition to
the previously discussed impacts of oil prices on supply and demand, oil price changes inﬂuence foreign
exchange markets and inﬂation, giving thus rise to indirect eﬀects on real activity.3
The related empirical studies started by ﬁnding a linear negative relationship between oil prices and
real activity in oil importing countries.4 By the mid-1980s, however, the estimated linear relationship
between oil prices and real activity began to lose signiﬁcance. In fact, the declines in oil prices occurred
over the second half of the 1980s were found to have smaller positive eﬀects on economic activity than
predicted by linear models. Thus, Mork (1989),5 Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996) introduced
1It has normally been the case that international spillovers through trade have reinforced these eﬀects among oil importing
industrial economies. This is due to the fact that these economies (which are overall negatively aﬀected by oil price increases)
trade mostly among themselves and that oil exporting countries do not use all the extra income induced by high oil prices
in ways that end up increasing their own demand for foreign products.
2For this reason, the theoretical literature has been of a general equilibrium nature, with diﬀerent authors assigning
diﬀerent weights to the supply and demand channels. See, for example, Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981), Kim and Loungani
(1992), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). One of the key common features of these models is the linearity assumed
between the logarithm of real GDP and the logarithm of the price of oil. For these models, an oil price decline of a given
size is as beneﬁcial to economic activity as an oil price increase of the same size is detrimental to it.
3Some of these indirect eﬀects may involve economic policy reactions. For instance, authors like Bohi (1989) and
Bernanke et al. (1997) argue that economic downturns observed after oil price shocks are caused by a combination of direct
impacts of the shocks themselves and the monetary responses to them.
4Those studies include Rasche and Tatom (1981), Darby (1982), Hamilton (1983), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), and
Gisser and Goodwin (1986). While all these contributions consider the case of the US, Darby (1982) and Burbidge and Har-
rison (1984) also analysed other developed countries (Japan, Germany, the UK, Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands
in the former case, and Japan, Germany, the UK and Canada in the latter).
5Mork’s study found that the eﬀects of oil price increases are diﬀerent from those of decreases, and that oil price decreases
are not statistically signiﬁcant in the US. This implied a departure from the linear speciﬁcations, in which oil price rises and
falls have symmetrically equal impacts on real activity. Mork’s contribution has proved inﬂuential in that many authors
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prices and economic downturns, as well as to analyse Granger causality between both variables. More
recently, Hamilton (2003) and Jiménez-Rodríguez (2004) also found evidence of a non-linear relationship
b e t w e e nt h et w ov a r i a b l e sf o rt h eU Se c o n o m y .T ob em o r es p e c i ﬁc about the non-linear transformations
proposed in the empirical literature, Mork (1989) allowed for an asymmetric response of the US economic
activity to oil price changes by specifying increases and decreases in the real price of oil as separate
variables. He found that the eﬀects of oil price increases were diﬀerent from those of decreases, and that
oil price decreases were not statistically signiﬁcant.6 Given that the asymmetry is a very special case
of non-linear relationship between GDP and oil prices, the literature has proposed two other non-linear
transformations, namely: scaled speciﬁcation (Lee et al., 1995), taking the volatility of oil prices into
account;7 and net speciﬁcation (Hamilton, 1996), which considers the amount by which oil prices have
gone up over the last year.
While the recent empirical literature has thus developed into the area of non-linear modelling, the
theoretical literature is normally not explicit about asymmetries in the response of real activity to oil
prices. The main exception to this is given by one economic justiﬁcation for an asymmetric relationship
that has been oﬀered in the literature. For instance, Lilien (1982) has formulated the so-called dispersion
hypothesis, which relies on the argument that a change in oil price alters the equilibrium allocation across
various sectors. More concretely, this explanation relates to adjustment costs resulting from the implied
sectoral reallocation of resources.8 According to this argument, an increase (decrease) in oil prices would
lead to a contraction (expansion) in sectors that make use of oil in the production process. Moreover,
the increase (decrease) in oil prices would generate an expansion (contraction) of energy-eﬃcient sectors
relative to energy-intensive sectors. However, given that in the short run the cost of reallocation of
resources between sectors is high, oil shocks that imply readjustment between energy-eﬃcient and energy-
intensive sectors will give rise to an overall loss in output. While this loss will aggravate the economic
have thereafter not even considered the possibility of eﬀects derived from a decrease in oil prices.
6Mork et al. (1994) documented the asymmetry in the inverse relationship between oil price and aggregate economic
activity for countries other than the US (including both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries). In particular, they found
asymmetry in the cases of Norway and all G-7 countries but Italy.
7Ferderer (1996) also considers oil price volatility, albeit in a diﬀerent way. He constructs a measure of it and plugs it
into the empirical model alongside the level of oil prices. As the author recognises, this procedure is confronted with the
diﬃculty usually found in isolating the level and volatility channels.
8For related approaches, see Loungani (1986), and Davis (1987), Hamilton (1988), and Davis et al. (1997). In addition
to the theoretical reason for the asymmetric real eﬀect given in the text, the presence of an asymmetric pattern in the
changes of prices of crude and oil reﬁning products themselves may provide a further, in this case empirical, justiﬁcation.
In this regard, Bacon (1991), Karrenbock (1991), and Balke et al. (1998) have all found evidence of asymmetric response
in gasoline prices. Their common ﬁnding is that gasoline prices rise more quickly when oil prices are increasing than they
fall when oil prices are decreasing.
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thereby giving rise to the asymmetric eﬀect.
The present paper extends the existing empirical literature in two directions. First, unlike most of
the existing literature, which focuses on the oil importing US economy,9 we analyse the eﬀe c t so fa no i l
price shock in the main industrialised countries (individual G-7 countries, Norway and the euro area as
a whole). While most of these countries are oil importing, we also include in our sample two net oil
exporting countries, namely the UK and Norway. Second, we assess the relation between oil prices and
real activity using the linear and three leading non-linear approaches. To our knowledge, this paper is
the ﬁrst to assess the impact of oil price shocks on the level of real activity in the main industrialised
OECD countries considering such variety of econometric speciﬁcations.
Our main ﬁn d i n g sm a yb es u m m a r i s e da sf o l l o w s . A saﬁrst step, Granger causality-type analysis
permits us to conclude that the interaction between oil prices and macroeconomic variables is found to
be signiﬁcant, with the direction of causality going in at least one direction in all countries, and in both
directions in most countries. The eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei no i lp r i c e so nr e a lG D Pg r o w t ha r ef o u n dt o
diﬀer substantially from those of an oil price decrease, providing evidence against the linear approach
that assumes that oil prices have symmetric eﬀects on the real economy. An increase in oil prices is found
to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the GDP growth in all oil importing countries but Japan. In the
latter country, the model fails to identify any negative real eﬀect of oil prices, possibly due to the special
circumstances undergone by the Japanese economy. This unexpected result, however, is not robust to
changes in the lag speciﬁcation. With regard to the two net oil exporting countries under consideration,
oil prices are found to aﬀect positively Norwegian GDP growth, while having a negative impact on oil
exporter UK’s economic activity (relating to the standard Dutch disease eﬀect). In addition, the eﬀects of
an oil price hike on GDP growth are overall strongest for the US, although euro area countries (Germany,
France and Italy) exhibit similarly strong real eﬀects when we use non-linear modelling. Two non-linear
approaches, namely the asymmetric and scaled speciﬁcations, allow us to compare the impact of oil price
rises and falls. In these cases, we ﬁnd that a decline in oil prices aﬀects signiﬁcantly only a few countries,
having a positive impact on the US and UK economies while doing harm to the Canadian economy. The
latter result can be explained by the fact that large decreases in oil prices took place after the early
1980s, which is when Canada was switching from a net oil importer into a net oil exporter. Inspection
of conﬁdence bands around impulse responses allow us to assess that non-linear models tend to yield a
more precise representation of the relationship between GDP growth and oil price changes. Moreover,
evidence on the relative performance of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations suggests that the model that controls
for the volatility of oil price shocks (i.e. the scaled speciﬁcation) appears to dominate competing models
9Some of the few relevant exceptions are cited in footnotes 4 and 6.
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econometric results. Variance decomposition analysis suggests that oil price shocks are a considerable
source of volatility for many of the variables in the model. For real GDP, oil prices shocks are together
with monetary shocks the largest source of variation other than the variable itself for most of the countries.
Finally, we do not ﬁnd evidence of instability of the oil price coeﬃcients of the GDP equation in any
model with the exception of the linear speciﬁcation for the euro area.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. Section 3 presents the
empirical results. Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 4.
2 Methodology
We consider the following vector autoregression model of order  (or simply, VAR()):10
 =  +
 X
=1
Φ− + ,( 2 . 1 )
where  is a ( ×1) vector of endogenous variables,  =( 17)0 is the (7 × 1) intercept vector of the
VAR, Φ is the ith (7 ×7) matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients for  =1  2 ,a n d =( 17)0 is
the (7 × 1) generalisation of a white noise process.
In this paper we use a quarterly seven-variable VAR for each country under study. The variables
considered for the model are the following: real GDP, real eﬀective exchange rate (REER),11 real oil
price, real wage, inﬂation, and short and long-term interest rates. Some variables (real GDP, REER,
real oil price and real wage) are expressed in logs, while the remaining ones are simply deﬁn e di nl e v e l s .
We include real oil prices and real GDP growth since our main objective is to analyse the eﬀects of
the former variable on the latter.12 We use only one measure of economic activity, namely, real GDP,
thus doing without a separate role for unemployment. The remaining variables are included to capture
some of the most important transmission channels through which oil prices may aﬀect economic activity
indirectly, in part by inducing changes in economic policies. Those channels include eﬀects of oil prices
on inﬂation and exchange rates, which then induce changes in real economic activity. Our VAR model
also incorporates a monetary sector (by means of short- and long-term interest rates rather than money
10Sims (1980) was the ﬁrst to represent the reduced form of a standard macroeconomic model as a multivariate dynamic
system. This dynamic model was given by an “unconstrained” (i.e. restrictions only on lag length) vector autoregression.
11REER is deﬁned such that an increase means a real appreciation of the currency considered. An appreciation of the
real exchange rate is expected to hurt the country’s external competitiveness.
12W ef o l l o wt h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r ei nm e a s u r i n gt h ev a l u eo ft h eo i lp r i c eexcluding taxes. The reason is simply that there
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(by using a real wages index), in light of the role it may play with regard to aggregate demand or supply.13
As is customary in studies focusing on the impact of oil prices, we do not use import prices as a whole
but only oil prices,14 while also allowing for the exchange rate to capture part of the pass-through from
import prices (in foreign currency) into domestic prices.
The choice of the oil price variable is a diﬃcult and important one. We deﬁne oil prices in real terms,
taking the ratio of the price of an internationally traded variety of crude (UK Brent) in US dollars to the
US Producer Price Index. This way of measuring oil prices has three important advantages over competing
deﬁnitions.15 First, it avoids the undesirable property resulting from nominal oil price deﬁnitions (e.g.
Hamilton, 1996) that, owing to positive inﬂation, an identical shock to the nominal price would tend
to induce a decreasing eﬀect on real variables over the sample period. Second, in the context of the
methodology followed here, our deﬁnition of real oil prices represents a common shock to all countries. It
is important to be aware, however, that the actual economic impact of the oil shock would be modiﬁed
in countries other than the US by changes in the bilateral real exchange rate.16 Third, by taking the real
price directly aﬀecting the US, the deﬁnition used here makes our results comparable with those found in
the large majority of the literature.17 One caveat to our deﬁnition is that the econometric models that
we use cannot recover the real price of oil facing each individual economy other than the US. This has to
do with the fact that we do not have in our models a bilateral real exchange against the US dollar, but
a broader exchange rate variable deﬁn e di ne ﬀective terms.
Before studying the eﬀects of oil shocks on economic activity, we proceed to investigate the stochastic
13The eﬀect of an increase in oil prices on the labour market itself is hard to assess. On the one hand, the increase in the
price of a substitute input (particularly if capital is complementary to oil) implies a higher demand for labour and higher
real wages, while, on the other hand, the overall lower level of production implies a downward pressure on both the demand
for labour and real wages.
14We do not follow authors such as Bernanke et al. (1997) and Brown and Yücel (1999), who use both an oil price index
and an overall commodity price index.
15A comparable deﬁnition has been used in a multi-country study by Darby (1982).
16We prefer the deﬁnition used here over that used by Mork et al. (1994) which converts the dollar world price of crude
into each respective country’s currency. By getting closer to the real oil price aﬀecting each country, their deﬁnition brings
i no n em o r ev a r i a b l e-t h ee x c h a n g er a t e-w h i c hw o u l df u r t h e rb l u rt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation of a structural shock. Moreover, their
deﬁnition varies from country to country, and no comparison could thus be made of the impact of a given size of the oil
shock for a concrete episode.
17See, e.g., Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995), Carruth et al. (1998), and Hooker (1996, 1999). We do not follow Burbidge
and Harrison (1984), who deﬂate the price of oil using a weighted average of the consumer price indices in ﬁve advanced
economies. By using this special deﬂator, their study becomes harder to compare with the rest of the literature.
While the literature on the American experience normally uses a diﬀerent data source for the price of crude oil, i.e. a
US-based nominal price of oil, this does not make a diﬀerence in light of the very high correlation among alternative crude
prices that is observed at a quarterly frequency.
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a series of unit root tests. Speciﬁcally, we perform the 	

 and  tests of Elliott et al. (1996),
and the 	

 and  tests of Elliott (1999), as well as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
(See Appendix 1).18 Results of these formal tests are summarised in Tables 1A-1C, indicating that the
ﬁrst diﬀerences of all seven variables are stationary. We therefore follow the related literature in deﬁning
the vector  in (2.1) to be given by the ﬁrst log-diﬀerences of the ﬁrst four aforementioned variables
(real GDP, REER, real oil price, and real wage), along with the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the remaining ones
(inﬂation, and short and long-term interest rates).19
The VAR system can be transformed into its Moving Average representation in order to analyse the
system’s response to a real oil price shock, that is:
 =  +
∞ X
=0
Ψ−,( 2 . 2 )




average representation is used to obtain both the forecast error variance decomposition and the impulse-
response functions. The variance decomposition shows the proportion of the unanticipated changes of a
variable that is attributable to its own innovations and to shocks to other variables in the system.
In order to assess the impact of shocks on endogenous variables, we examine the orthogonalised
impulse-response functions, using Cholesky decomposition, as well as the accumulated responses. To do
so, we should choose an ordering for the variables in the system, since this method of orthogonalisation
involves the assignment of contemporaneous correlation only to speciﬁc series. Thus, the ﬁrst variable in
the ordering is not contemporaneously aﬀected by shocks to the remaining variables, but shocks to the
ﬁrst variable do aﬀect the other variables in the system; the second variable aﬀects contemporaneously
the other variables (with the exception of the ﬁrst one), but it is not contemporaneously aﬀected by
them; and so on. In our case, we have assumed the following ordering: real GDP, real oil price, inﬂation,
short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, real wage, and REER.20 This ordering assumes, as in
much of the related literature, that real output does not react contemporaneously on impact to the rest
of the variables. The oil price variable is also ranked as a largely exogenous variable, which have an
immediate impact on the rate of inﬂation. The latter is then allowed to feed into changes in interest
rates, while two relative prices, namely the real wage rate and the exchange rate, close the system.
18It is worth noting that the tests proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) and Elliott (1999) are more powerful than the
Dickey-Fuller test.
19An alternative valid approach would be to estimate a cointegrated VAR model, in which non-stationary variables enter
the model in levels, while being allowed to interact through long-run relationships.
20The two standard error bands around the impulse responses are based on Lutkepohl (1990).
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rate, long-term interest rate, real GDP, real wage, REER, real oil price, and inﬂation.21 This alternative
ordering takes into consideration some plausible aspects that are not incorporated in the baseline ordering,
namely:22
i) given that the oil price is an asset price and thus likely to react to ﬁnancial variables, making the
assumption that it is contemporaneously exogenous could be found to be restrictive;
ii) given that crude oil is an important input in the production process, we still allow the price level
to adjust contemporaneously to oil prices;
iii) the alternative ordering also allows for a non-zero contemporaneous impact of interest rate shocks
on output.
We start by estimating a linear speciﬁcation of the VAR in (2.1). Furthermore, on the basis of the
previous empirical literature and economic arguments we also consider three non-linear transformations
of oil prices. Such non-linear transformations are the following: 1) asymmetric speciﬁcation,i nw h i c h
increases and decreases in the price of oil are considered as separate variables; 2) scaled speciﬁcation (Lee
et al., 1995), which takes the volatility of oil prices into account; and 3) net speciﬁcation (Hamilton,
1996), where the relevant oil price variable is deﬁned to be the net amount by which these prices in
quarter  exceed the maximum value reached in the previous four quarters.23
The asymmetric speciﬁcation distinguishes between the positive rate of change in the oil price, +
 ,
and its negative rate of change, 
−















    0
0 
where  i st h er a t eo fc h a n g ei nt h er e a lo i lp r i c e .T h easymmetric model can be rationalised in terms
of the dispersion hypothesis described in the Introduction.
21We also considered alternative orderings, verifying that the impulse responses - which we do not report here due to
space constraints - do not change considerably compared with the baseline speciﬁcation. For instance, in the case of an
alternative ordering that only diﬀers from the baseline model in that we allow for the contemporaneous inﬂuence of real oil
price innovation on GDP growth, the contemporaneous eﬀect is all that changes, being zero when the oil-price variable is
not placed at the top of the ordering.
22Another way of addressing this issue would be to identify the structural model by mean of a sign-restricted VAR as in
Peersman (2003). We leave this for further research.
23Unlike Hamilton (1996), who uses nominal oil price, Mork (1989) and Lee et al. (1995) use the real price of oil. As
explained before, the present paper follows the latter approach.
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May 2004The scaled and net speciﬁcations were developed by Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996), re-
spectively, to account for the fact that oil price increases after a long period of price stability have
more dramatic macroeconomic consequences than those that are merely corrections to greater oil price
decreases during the previous quarter. In order to put this idea in practice, these authors use some
transformation of the oil price variable. Lee et al. (1995) proposed the following AR(4)-GARCH(1,1)
representation of oil prices:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−2 + 3−3 + 4−4 + 
|−1 ∼ (0 )
 = 0 + 12
−1 + 2−1









  stands for scaled oil price increases, while 
 	 for scaled oil price decreases.T h escaled
model builds on the asymmetric model, while it also employs a transformation of the oil price that stan-
dardises the estimated residuals of the autoregressive mod e lb yi t st i m e - v a r y i n g( c o nditional) variability.
This transformation seems very plausible in light of the pattern of oil price changes over time, with most
changes being rather small and being punctuated by occasional sizeable shocks.
Hamilton (1996) proposed a diﬀerent non-linear transformation, by using as an explanatory variable
what he calls net oil price increase ( ). This variable is deﬁned to be the amount by which (the log
of) oil prices in quarter , , exceed the maximum value over the previous 4 quarters; and 0 otherwise.
That is:
  =m a x{0  − max{−1 −2 −3 −4}}
Hamilton’s deﬁnition is also asymmetric in the speciﬁc sense that it captures oil price increase-type
shocks while neglecting the impact of oil price declines. This is inspired by earlier evidence that oil price
decreases had played a smaller role in the US business cycle.
The sample period used is common to all countries under study, and it runs (including the lagged initial
values) from 1972:III to 2001:IV, for a total of " =1 1 8available quarterly observations (See Appendix
2). To ﬁnd the suitable lag length, we consider diﬀerent tests, namely, the Sims’ (1980) modiﬁcation of
the Likelihood Ratio test, as well as the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn Criteria. Whenever there is
disagreement among the diﬀerent tests, the optimal lag length is chosen using the Likelihood Ratio test.
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In this section we analyse the empirical results for the linear and the three non-linear models described
in the previous section. While most of these countries in our sample are net oil importing, we also include
in our sample two net oil exporting European countries, namely the UK and Norway (see Figure 1).24
In subsection 3.1 we test for the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerent oil price variables and carry out Granger-
causality analysis in a multivariate context. We next turn in subsection 3.2 to the examination of
the eﬀects of oil price shocks on GDP growth. Before presenting formally the results, we compare the
performance of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations considered here in order to focus on that speciﬁcation preferred
for each country. We then present the results on impulse-response functions and accumulated responses,
distinguishing between the cases of the net oil importing countries and the two exporting countries under
study. We next discuss the results of the variance decompositions. In the cases of both impulse response
and variance decomposition analysis, we examine the results for all linear and non-linear speciﬁcations,
while focusing on the preferred speciﬁcation for each country. In subsection 3.3 we test for the stability
of the oil price coeﬃcients of the GDP equation under the four competing models for each country.
3.1 Testing for signiﬁcance and Granger-causality
Under this item we investigate the relationship between oil prices and the other variables of the
model, focusing on the signiﬁcance of the impact of oil prices on real activity. We carry out diﬀerent
tests for both linear and non-linear speciﬁcations for all countries.
First, we perform the Wald test statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that all of the oil price
coeﬃcients are jointly zero in the GDP equation of the VAR model.25 Table 2 displays the p-values of
the Wald test statistic, indicating that we accept the hypothesis that the diﬀerent oil prices variables (in
either linear or non-linear models) are not statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% critical level in most of the
countries considered.26 This means that oil prices do not appear to have a signiﬁcant direct impact on
real activity.27
24Norway and the UK switched from a position of net oil importing to oil exporting in the 1970s. Canada also switched
its position at the beginning of the 1980s (See Figure 1), making it hard to interpret the results for Canada. Since our
sample starts in 1972:III, Canada has been a net oil importer during three of the four oil crises considered. As such, we
thereafter consider Canada tentatively as a net oil importing country.
25Some authors, like for instance Hooker (1999) in the related literature, call this test a multivariate Granger causality
test. We reserve this name for some block exogeneity-type tests reported below.
26T h em a i ne x c e p t i o ni st h ee u r oa r e aa saw h o l e ,i nw h i c hc a s ea l lo ft h en o n - l i n e a ro i lp r i c ev a r i a b l e sa r es t a t i s t i c a l l y
signiﬁcant at a 5% critical level.
27We have also considered the bivariate Granger-causality test, whose null hypothesis is that the oil price variable under
consideration does not Granger-cause real GDP growth. The results indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected in
three cases (US, the euro area, and Italy) under the linear model and the oil price increase variables of the non-linear
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a whole, being the null hypothesis that all of the oil price coeﬃcients are jointly zero in all equations
of the system but its own equation (See Table 3). This Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is thus informative
in that it could well be that oil prices do not aﬀect GDP directly (as assessed by the Wald test), but
through third variables in the system. We ﬁnd that the oil price variable in the linear model, the positive
changes in the asymmetric model, the SOPI, and the NOPI are signiﬁcant for the system in all of the
countries, with the only exception of the US in the linear model. The latter result is consistent with
the concerns expressed in the literature about the poor performance of US linear models since the mid-
1980s.28 Moreover, the negative changes in the asymmetric and scaled models are not signiﬁcant in most
countries. These negative changes are only signiﬁcant in Canada and the UK for both models, and in the
US for the former model.29 The price decrease variable is subsequently eliminated from those asymmetric
and scaled speciﬁcations in which it is not signiﬁcant.30
Finally, we perform some so-called tests of block exogeneity, including two multivariate Granger-
causality tests. We ﬁrst test the null hypothesis that the oil price variable under consideration is Granger-
caused by the remaining variables of the system (See Table 4, line 1 for each country). We generally reject
the null hypothesis.31 Second, we test for whether a given oil price variable Granger-causes the remaining
variables of the system (See Table 4, line 2 for each country), obtaining that oil price variables generally
Granger-cause the remaining variables of the system at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The exceptions to this
are the linear models of the US and the euro area, as well as the scaled and net speciﬁcations for the
US. Third, we perform the test for the lack of any relationship between oil prices and the rest of the
approaches. Instead, we cannot reject the null in the cases of Germany, Japan, Canada and Norway. In the cases of France
and the UK the results depend on the model considered. More speciﬁc a l l y ,i nF r a n c ew ed on o tr e j e c tt h en u l la tt h e5 %
signiﬁcance level (but we reject it at the 10% level) in the case of the linear model, while we reject it for all oil price increase
variables. In the UK we accept the null at the 5% level in all cases but the net speciﬁcation (although we reject the null
at the 10% level also for the latter speciﬁcation). Furthermore, we accept in all models the null hypothesis that oil price
decrease variables do not Granger-cause real GDP growth. (These results are available from the author upon request).
28This result for the US is consistent with the concerns expressed in the literature about the poor performance of linear
models since the mid-1980s. Already in the late 1980s, Mork (1989) - who also employed a multivariate framework - found
that the oil price coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcant at the 5% critical level in his US GNP equation, showing only borderline
signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
29Similar results for Canada and the US are found by Mork et al. (1994) using a somewhat diﬀerent version of the
asymmetric speciﬁcation. The ﬁnding that oil price decreases are found to be signiﬁcant for the US economy, with the
implication that we shall thus explicitly consider the impact of the negative oil price variable, contrasts with the approach
of most of the studies in the literature who simply omit consideration of oil price decreases in their models.
30We have also tested for the null hypothesis that positive and negative coeﬃcients are equal in the VAR framework,
obtaining the rejection of null hypothesis in all cases. For this reason, in the cases where the negative movements are
signiﬁcant we consider positive and negative oil prices as separate variables.
31The exceptions to this are given by the linear models of the US and Canada (where we can reject the null at the 10%
level), as well as the linear model of Italy, the net model of Canada and all models of Norway.
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the hypothesis that there is no relationship between oil prices and the rest of the system in all countries
but Norway - results which are robust across model speciﬁcations.32
In sum, the results show that the interaction between oil prices and macroeconomic variables is
generally signiﬁcant, with the direction of causality going in at least one direction in all countries and in
both directions in most countries.
3.2 Macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks: Linear and non-linear spec-
iﬁcations
In this subsection, we assess empirically the eﬀects of oil price shocks on economic activity. In order to
simplify the presentation of the results, we distinguish between linear and non-linear models, focusing on
the preferred model speciﬁcation for each country. We ﬁrst present, under item 3.2.1, the results derived
both from the examination of the impulse-response functions and from their corresponding accumulated
responses. This analysis is preceded by an assessment of the relative performance of diﬀerent linear and
non-linear speciﬁcations, which allows us to focus on the preferred model for each country. In item 3.2.2,
we study the sources of variation of each variable of the VARs by means of variance decomposition. Under
ﬁnal item 3.2.3 we present the stability analysis of the GDP equations of the VAR system.
3.2.1 Impulse response functions and accumulated responses
Under this item we examine the eﬀects of oil prices on GDP growth in terms of both orthogonalised
impulse-response functions and accumulated responses for the linear and the non-linear speciﬁcations of
the model. Figure 2 represents the orthogonalised impulse response functions of GDP growth to one
standard deviation oil price shock with their corresponding two standard error bands in the linear case,
while Figures 3.1 through 5 represent those for non-linear speciﬁcations of the model.33 In turn, the ﬁrst
ﬁve lines of Table 5 for each country reports the accumulated responses of GDP growth to an oil price
shock normalised to correspond to a 1% increase in the linear model, while the last ﬁfteen lines for each
country reports those obtained in the non-linear models under study. In order to better understand the
mechanisms behind the impulse and accumulated responses of GDP growth, we have analysed impulse
32Consideration of all tests reported in Table 4 suggest that the result for Norway is driven by the already mentioned
lack of response of oil prices to the remaining variables of the system.
33In the linear model, the optimal lag length was found to be four for all countries but France, Italy and Norway, where
the appropriate lag length is three. In the case of the non-linear models, the optimal lag lengths remain the same as in the
linear speciﬁcation for all countries in which the oil price measures are statistically signiﬁcant. The only exception to the
latter statement was Canada in the case of the net speciﬁcation, where the optimal lag is no longer four but three.
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 362
May 2004and accumulated responses of other variables.34 We ﬁnd that one of the key channels playing a role
in the eﬀect of oil prices on real activity is related to the real eﬀective exchange rate. Table 6 reports
accumulated responses of REER to an oil price shock normalised to correspond to a 1% increase in the
corresponding current oil price measure under study, the Table’s ﬁrst ﬁve lines referring to the case of
the linear model and the last ﬁfteen lines referring to the corresponding non-linear speciﬁcation of the
model under consideration.35
We describe the results for the three non-linear speciﬁcations, namely the asymmetric, scaled and net
approaches at the same time, stressing the results obtained for the preferred model. We choose to do this
because the results tend to be qualitatively similar across non-linear models. When discussing the results,
we distinguish between the results for net oil importing as opposed to those for the two exporting countries
here considered. While the linear model supposes that the eﬀe c t so fa no i lp r i c ei n c r e a s ea n dt h o s eo fa
decline are totally symmetric, non-linear speciﬁcations allow for diﬀerential impacts of oil shocks of the
same magnitude and opposite sign. 36 We have reported in subsection 3.1 that the negative movements
of oil prices in non-linear speciﬁcations are not statistically signiﬁcant in most of the countries under
study. We describe here the eﬀects of positive oil shocks for all speciﬁcations in all countries (as captured
by Figures 2, 3.1, 4.1, and 5), then turning to the impacts of negative oil shocks for the asymmetric and
scaled speciﬁcations in the few countries in which oil price decrease variables are signiﬁcant (see Figures
3.2 and 4.2).37 As far as the accumulated responses are concerned, the relevant lines in Tables 5 and 6
contain empty cells in the case of those countries for which the negative oil price measure was previously
found not to be signiﬁcant.
As mentioned before, let us start the analysis of results by evaluating the relative performance of the
diﬀerent linear and non-linear speciﬁcations for the whole VAR system of equations. This can be done
in two diﬀerent ways. First, the precision of the estimation of the impulse responses can be gauged by
looking at the conﬁdence bands as shown in Figures 2, and 3.1 through 5. We ﬁnd that the non-linear
34We only report ﬁgures referred to the accumulated impacts of oil shocks on other variables for the preferred speciﬁcation
(See Figure 6). We do not report any other ﬁgures or tables concerning the oil shock eﬀects on other variables, but summarily
highlight the main conclusions. (These results are available from the author upon request).
35We also present in the Figures of the Annex the impulse response functions for an alternative ordering, including
the comparison with the baseline ordering. We report the results for scaled speciﬁcation only. The results for all other
speciﬁcations are available from the authors upon request.
36In what follows, we refer to positive oil shock as one where the price of crude oil increases. Such measure is given by
the standard oil price changes in the linear model, and by variables +, ,a n d in the non-linear speciﬁcations.
Conversely, we refer to negative oil shock as one where the price decreases.
37We do not describe the results of the negative oil shocks in the linear model, since they are of the same magnitude than
those of the positive oil shocks but with opposite sign.
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area and Germany) a non-linear speciﬁcation yields a more accurate representation than the linear model,
while the linear model seems to dominate only in the case of the UK’s impulse responses. In the remaining
cases - namely France, Italy and Norway -, the linear model and at least one non-linear approach produce
similarly precise results. Second, we assess the goodness of ﬁt of the four diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
for each country. Given that these models are non-nested, we look at selection criteria such as the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Table 7 reports the
AIC and BIC for all countries obtained from each econometric speciﬁcation. On the basis of these two
criteria, we conclude that the scaled speciﬁcation performs in all countries somewhat better than the
other approaches used in the present study.38 This result indicates that it is important to consider not
just whether oil prices increase or decline (and by how much), but also the environment in which the
movements take place. An oil shock in a stabile price environment is likely to have larger economic
consequences than one in a volatile price environment. In this regard, the scaled model more speciﬁcally
highlights the importance of controlling for the time-varying conditional variability of oil price shocks.
3.2.1.1 Results for net oil importing countries
In the case of positive movements in oil prices, we observe that despite the fact that each of the
countries responds somewhat diﬀerently to an oil price shock, there is a similar pattern of impulse
response functions. In fact, we observe that the real impact of oil prices is negative in the short-term
with the only exception of Japan where it is positive. The largest negative short-run inﬂuence takes
place within the year of the shock, being reached in either the third or the fourth quarter after the
shock depending on the country and on the speciﬁcation under consideration.39 The impact of the shock
becomes very small after the ﬁrst year, dying out almost completely after three years.
Table 5 indicates that the accumulated responses of GDP growth to a positive oil price shock in the
linear and non-linear models are qualitatively similar. An oil price shock has a negative accumulated
eﬀect on GDP growth in all oil importing countries but Japan.40 With regard to the magnitude of the
38Hamilton (2003) also favours the scaled speciﬁcation in his study of the US economy. Jiménez-Rodríguez (2002) ﬁnds
that a kernel semiparametric speciﬁcation could improve even upon the scaled speciﬁcation in the case of the US. Given
that the estimation of a kernel model requires a longer sample that the one available for most of the countries represented
here, this methodology was not considered in the present paper.
39T h eo n l ye x c e p t i o nt ot h i si st h ea s y m m e t r i cc a s ei nt h eU S ,w h e r et h em a x i m u mn e g a t i v ee ﬀect occurs during the ﬁfth
quarter after the shock.
40As with the impulse responses, the accumulated result is not robust to changes in the order of the VAR. The second-
order VAR yields a negative accumulated impact of oil shocks in Japanese GDP growth, even though the loss of growth
is in this case relatively small (slightly less than 0.002% after 12 periods in the linear case). A negative real impact of oil
prices for Japan was also found by Lee et al. ( 2 0 0 1 )f o ras i m i l a rl a gr a n g e( 5t o7m o n t h si nt h e i rc a s e ) .
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Considering the linear model, we see that the accumulated loss of GDP growth after a 100% oil price shock
in the US is 3.2%, which is at least double the size of that observed in most of the other net oil importing
countries. One important mechanism that helps explain the larger negative eﬀects of an oil price hike on
US GDP growth is that the US is the only oil importing country for which the linear model yields a real
exchange rate appreciation after such shock (see the ﬁrst ﬁve lines in Table 6).42 Euro area countries
Germany, France and Italy also exhibit relatively large accumulated real impacts of a positive oil price
shock, which is consistent with a considerable oil dependency. The real eﬀective exchange depreciation
induced by the shock oﬀsets only in part the negative impact on output growth predominant in these
countries.43 Regarding non-linear speciﬁcations, we observe that Canada is the only country other than
the US for which an oil price hike is found in a robust fashion to induce an exchange rate appreciation in
eﬀective terms.44 Moreover, the non-linear speciﬁcations yield larger negative accumulated impacts on
G D Pg r o w t ht h a ni nt h el i n e a rc a s e ,w i t ht h e
  variant showing a larger impact than the  
approach and the latter in turn producing larger eﬀe c t st h a ni nt h e+ case. For instance, the output
loss of a 100% shock to oil prices increases from around 3.5% to a range of 4 to 6% in the US, from values
below 2% to levels ranging from 2 to 6% in the case of individual euro area countries, and from values
b e l o w1 %t ol e v e l sr a n g i n gf r o m1t o4 %i nt h ec a s eo ft h ee u r oa r e aa saw h o l e .T h eo n l ye x c e p t i o nt o
the statement that non-linear models yield larger real impacts of oil shocks than the linear model is the
net speciﬁcation for Canada, where the losses of GDP growth rate during the ﬁrst year and a half after
the shock are smaller than in the linear case. Except for this case, in Canada the accumulated output
loss from a 100% oil shock increases from very small values to around 1%.
T h eu n e x pe c t e dr e s u l to fapo s i t i v er e a c t i o no fJ a p a n e s eG D Pg r o w t ht oa no i lp r i c ei n c r e a s ei sc o m m o n
to linear and non-linear models. This result can be rationalised in terms of the peculiar circumstances
undergone by the Japanese economy during the period under study. Indeed, this economy proved rather
resilient to the oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s despite its large dependence on oil,45 while it
41Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Mork et al. (1994), and Bjrnland (2000) also ﬁnd a similar result.
42Amano and van Norden (1998) also ﬁnd that an oil price hike in the US is accompanied by an appreciation of its real
eﬀective exchange rate. Also broadly in line with our results, Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002) report that in the euro area
oil price increases induce a REER depreciation.
43The accumulated impulse response for the euro area as a whole shows a much smaller negative real impact of the oil
shock. This may be partly attributed to econometric problems relating to the aggregation of the transmission mechanisms
of the diﬀerent individual countries which formed the euro area only at the end of our sample.
44See Table 6. The fact that the Canadian dollar exhibits a real eﬀective appreciation represents a diﬀerence with respect
to the linear approach. Among European net oil importers, the euro area as a whole and France exhibit a real eﬀective
exchange rate depreciation which is robust across non-linear speciﬁcations (and also observed in the linear model). In Italy
and Germany, the sign of the accumulated impact on REER depends on the non-linear speciﬁcation in question.
45Mork (1994) also reports that, among the industrialised countries, the Japanese economy was the least hurt by higher
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exhibiting a negative economic performance traced to structural factors. Finally, it is worth noting that
the exceptional results for Japanese output growth after an oil shock are not robust to changes in the
order of the VAR.46
In the case of decreases in oil prices, we ﬁnd evidence of a jointly signiﬁcant negative impact on US
real GDP growth according to the asymmetric speciﬁcation - a result that contrasts with the earlier
literature which found no evidence of any signiﬁcant eﬀect. The positive impulse responses for GDP
growth start after the ﬁrst year, contributing to turn positive the medium-term accumulated eﬀects.
However, the signiﬁcance of this eﬀect vanishes when we look at the results obtained using the scaled
model - a somewhat better speciﬁcation in terms of the analysis done at the beginning of this subsection.
In Canada, the asymmetric and scaled approaches both yield the surprising result that a lower oil price
induces a fall in GDP growth and a real eﬀective exchange-rate appreciation. One possible interpretation
of this unexpected result is that the largest oil price decreases occurred after the early 1980s, that is,
after the country switched from net oil importer into net oil exporter.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the output growth of all countries but Japan responds negatively to an increase
in oil prices. Focusing on the preferred (scaled) speciﬁcation, we obtain the following results. The largest
negative impact on GDP occurs in the fourth quarter after the shock in all countries but France and
Italy, where it takes place in the third quarter after the shock. The eﬀects of the shock die out almost
completely after three years in all countries. An increase of a 100% yields a negative accumulated eﬀect
on GDP growth of around 5% in the US47 a n dG e r m a n y ,4 %i nI t a l y ,3 %i nF r a n c e ,2 %i nt h ee u r oa r e a ,
and 1% in Canada. The appreciation of the real exchange rate in the US and Germany contributes to
explain why the larger negative impacts on economic activity are found in these two countries.48 France,
Italy and the euro area as a whole also exhibit considerable negative impacts on their real GDP despite
the fact that the depreciation of their real eﬀective exchange rates plays a partly oﬀsetting role. Turning
to variables other than GDP and REER, the results indicate that an oil price shock increases inﬂation
and long-term interest rates in all countries but Germany, as well as the short-term interest rates in all
countries with the exception of the US, Germany and the euro area.49 Regarding the impact of oil shock
oil prices following the Yom Kippur War started in 1973.
46For instance, when we use a VAR with two lags, the largest short-run response of GDP growth to oil shock is negative
and takes place during either the third (linear and scaled speciﬁcations) or the fourth (asymmetric and net speciﬁcations)
quarter after the shock (see Figure 7).
47This result for the US is broadly in line with the elasticity estimated in the related literature. See, for example, Mory
(1993), and Mork et al. (1994).
48In the German case, the REER appreciation does not take place in the net speciﬁcation. Instead, the REER depreciates
slightly, contributing to reduce the decline in GDP to some 4%.
49In these three cases both interest rates actually fall after one year.
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results are plausible and provide evidence of transmission mechanisms - other than the exchange rate
channel - playing the expected roles in most countries. Furthermore, oil price increases generally have
an impact on GDP growth of a larger magnitude than that of oil price declines, with the latter being
statistically insigniﬁcant in all countries with the exception of Canada. In particular, Canada responds
negatively to a decline in the oil price variable, being the largest negative impact in the third quarter
after the shock and with an accumulated output loss after a 100% decline in oil prices of around 2.5%.
These losses may be related to the fact that there is a larger real exchange rate appreciation after such
shock. Moreover, despite the fact that an oil price decline reduces inﬂation and, consequently, increases
real wages, the short- and long-term interest rates rises.
3.2.1.2 Results for net oil exporting countries
Regarding positive movements in oil prices, we observe that there is a similar general pattern in the
reaction of British and Norwegian real GDP growth to oil prices within the ﬁrst year, with a positive
response during the ﬁrst two quarters followed by a negative response during the next two quarters. After
the ﬁrst year, the impulse responses diﬀer somewhat in the two countries, which leads to the diﬀerence
in Table 5 in terms of the accumulated impact beyond the short term, with overall a positive real impact
in Norway and negative real impact in the UK. This means that the UK exhibits a surprising behaviour:
while it is expected that an oil price shock has positive eﬀects on the GDP growth for a net oil exporting
country, an oil price increase of 100% actually leads to a loss of British GDP growth rate of more than
1% after the ﬁrst year in all speciﬁcations. An extensive literature has highlighted that this unexpected
result has to do with the fact that oil price hikes led to a large real exchange rate appreciation of the
pound (Dutch disease), a fact that is captured in the results presented in Table 6. In connection with
this, Table 6 also shows that the Norway’s real exchange rate appreciation after the ﬁrst year is much
weaker than in the British case, thereby lessening the positive impact of oil shock on Norwegian GDP
growth by a considerably smaller amount.51 With respect to the magnitude of the accumulated response,
50This is also the case in the euro area between the third and the seventh quarters after the shock.
51In addition to the exchange rate responses, adjustments in real wages and interest rates provide additional insights as to
why the oil shock improves Norway’s output performance while harming the British economy. Indeed, an oil price increase
leads to a stronger positive adjustment in interest rates in the UK, together with a diﬀerent behaviour of real wages - which
decrease in the UK but rise in Norway. Real wage developments are in line with a stronger inﬂationary impact of oil prices
in the British case.
In her study of the manufacturing production of the UK and Norway, Bjrnland (1998) ﬁnds that an oil shock has a
positive real impact in the case of Norway and an adverse real eﬀect in the British case. This study also highlights the role of
the labour market, while tracing some of the diﬀerential behaviour of the two economies to the response of unemployment
(rather than real wages). Bjrnland also mentions that, in the case of Norway and unlike the British case, deliberate
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GDP growth after three years of similar magnitude, which is for both models somewhat larger than the
overall eﬀect captured by the asymmetric and linear approaches. Indeed, in the UK the output loss of a
100% shock to oil prices increases from less than 2% in the asymmetric and linear approaches to above
2% in the net and scaled models, while in Norway the output gain rises from values of around 1% in the
former speciﬁcations to levels above 2% in the latter.
Oil price decrease variables are only signiﬁcant in the case of the UK. Figures 3.2 and 4.2 show that
the shapes of the impulse-response functions of British GDP growth to changes in the − and 
 	
variables are largely similar. In accumulated terms, Table 5 reports that both the asymmetric and scaled
models exhibit a positive accumulated eﬀect,52 which is somewhat larger in the latter case.
In sum, we observe, focusing on the preferred (scaled) speciﬁcation, that whereas the Norwegian
output growth responds positively to an increase in the oil price variable with an accumulated gain
around 2.5% after an increase of a 100%, the British output growth is “unexpectedly” negatively aﬀected
with an accumulated loss of around 2%. The diﬀerence in the responses between the two countries can be
explained in part by the fact that there is a larger exchange rate appreciation in the UK, and in part by
the diﬀerent adjustments in inﬂation, interest rates and real wages. In particular, the British inﬂation and
interest rates suﬀer from stronger positive adjustment than those of Norway, and whereas the Norwegian
real wage increases that of the UK decreases. Furthermore, declines in the oil price variable are only
signiﬁcant in the UK, with this country behaving as one would expect from an oil importing country,
i.e., showing an accumulated output gain of around 6% following a 100% decline in oil prices. When
comparing the impact on British GDP growth of oil price increases with that of oil price decreases, we
see that the latter have a much larger eﬀect (about three times as large). Moreover, we observe that an
oil price decline leads to a large real exchange rate depreciation, increases real wages, and reduces the
short- and long-term interest rates, as well as inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst year.
3.2.2 Variance decomposition analysis
Tables 8.A through 8.D present the results of the forecast error variance decomposition, which shows
how much of the unanticipated changes of the variables are explained by diﬀerent shocks.53 The variance
subsidies were implemented to maintain manufacturing output in periods of high oil prices.
52Again, in light of the real eﬀective depreciation documented in Table 6, the impact of a fall in oil prices on real GDP
growth can be interpreted as a Dutch disease eﬀect operating in reverse direction.
53We report, but do not analyse the variance decompositions for Japan. The reason is that the basic models for this
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in the model. For real GDP, oil prices are together with short-term interest rates the largest sources of
shock other than the variable itself for most of the countries. Innovations in short-term interest rates
represent monetary shocks in our model. The contribution of oil prices and short-term interest rates to
GDP variability ranges in most of the cases between 4% and 10%. The only two (partial) exceptions to
the leading role of these two variables are given by oil prices in Canada and short-term interest rates in
Italy, for which countries other variables - inﬂation and real wages, respectively - play a more important
role. In the case of Norway, shocks to real wages and REER exhibit a contribution to output volatility
which is comparable to that of oil prices and short-term interest rates.
We now turn to a comparison of the role of oil prices and short-term interest rates regarding GDP
variability between linear and non-linear models, focusing on the preferred (scaled) speciﬁcation. We
ﬁnd that shocks to oil price variables tend to explain more of output volatility in non-linear than in
linear speciﬁcations. In contrast, monetary shocks contribute to output volatility in similar percentage
in both linear and non-linear models. In consequence, the number of countries for which oil price shocks
contribute to GDP volatility more than monetary shocks is higher in non-linear models than in the linear
speciﬁcation. Indeed, while this is the case in only two countries for the linear model, it applies to at
least ﬁve countries (including the euro area region) when we use a non-linear approach - and exactly ﬁve
in the case of the scaled model. For the latter model, there are four countries (US, France, Italy and
the UK) and a region (the euro area) for which oil price shocks explain between 8% and 12% of output
variability.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that part of the movements in the short-term interest rate arise from changes
in oil prices. For the scaled model, the oil price variable contributes somewhat in the range of 5% to
15% of the volatility in the short-term interest rate, depending on the country. This result can in part
be interpreted as a reaction of monetary policy to oil price shocks.
In order to compare our results with those obtain in the related literature, we focus on the US case
while also referring to Bj#rnland (2000) who looks at variance decompositions for countries other than
the US (namely, Germany, the UK, and Norway). Dotsey and Reid (1992) found that oil prices explain
between 5% and 6% of the variation in GNP, whereas shocks to the federal funds rate explain about
5 %a n d8 %o ft h ev a r i a t i o ni nG N Pi nt h e i rp r e f e r r e ds p e c i ﬁcation. In the case of both variables, these
estimates are somewhat below the contributions reported in the present paper, while still being roughly
in line with them. Our ﬁnding on the contribution of oil shocks to output variability seems to lie within
the range of estimates computed in more recent studies. On the low side of this range, Brown and Yücel
(1999) show evidence that oil price shocks explain little of the variation in output, compared with the
much larger role played by monetary shocks. On the high side of the range, Bj#rnland (2000) ﬁnds that
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of oil shocks to GDP variability for some European countries, estimating it at 8% in Germany, 9% in
the UK, and 5% in Norway. These ﬁgures are roughly in line with the ones computed here. Overall, our
results are thus roughly consistent with the ﬁndings reported in the literature.
3.2.3 Stability test
In this subsection we investigate the stability of the oil price coeﬃcients in the GDP equation of the
VAR model. We do this for each country, considering in turn each of the four speciﬁcations used in the
paper. The tests we compute are the Andrews’s (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger’s (1994) tests. The
results are reported in Table 9.
The basic idea behind these stability tests is to compare the econometric results for the GDP equations
in the ﬁrst part of the sample with those obtained in the last part of the sample. More technically, we
deﬁne the ﬁrst part of the sample to be "1 =[ $"] and the last part of the sample to be "2 =[ ( 1−$)"]
where $ is some arbitrary fraction that we set equal to 30%, which determines that the period between
"1 and "2 lies between 1981:III and 1993:II. We then look for a possible breakdate 1 between "1 and "2.
Let the GDP equation of the VAR be written in the following way:




2&1([1] + 0&2 +  (3.1)
where  is the real GDP growth; &0 and &1 are -dimensional vectors which contain lags in  and
in oil price growth, respectively; &2 is a (( − 2) ×) × 1 vector which contains lags in all of the other
variables of the VAR model.54
Let 
(1) b et h eW a l dt e s to fe q u a l i t yo ft h ec o e ﬃcients '1 and '2 under the null hypothesis that















0 is the residual sum of squares from OLS estimation of (31) under the null hypothesis of no
structural break, and *

1 is the corresponding to unconstrained OLS estimation of (31).
Andrews (1993) proposes to test for the presence of a break point by the following test statistic:
sup




If the observed statistic passes the critical value, then the date 1 that satisﬁes sup
1≤1≤2

(1) will be the
estimated breakdate. Likewise, Andrews and Ploberger (1994) suggest two alternatives test statistics to
54Notice that 1 is a nuisance parameter that appears under the alternative hypothesis, but not under the null hypothesis.
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,-. 














The results in Table 9 suggest that, in general, there is no evidence of instability of oil price coeﬃcients
at a 5% signiﬁcance level for any speciﬁcation and for all countries. The only exception is the linear
speciﬁcation for the euro area, where we ﬁnd evidence of instability in 1981:IV.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper studies the eﬀects of oil price shocks on the real economic activity of the main industri-
alised OECD countries, distinguishing between net oil importing and exporting countries. We focus on
the relationship between oil prices and GDP growth, which is analysed in terms of vector autoregressions
by using four speciﬁcations, namely a linear model and three leading non-linear speciﬁcations proposed in
the literature. We ﬁnd evidence of non-linear eﬀects of oil price on real economic activity, with oil prices
(or a transformation thereof) having diﬀerent impacts on real output when they increase than when they
fall. This contrasts with the linear approach in which oil prices are assumed to have symmetrical impacts
on real activity.
As a ﬁrst step, Granger causality-type analysis permits us to conclude that the interaction between
oil variables and macroeconomic variables is found to be signiﬁcant, with the direction of causality going
in at least one direction in all countries and in both directions in most countries. The results we obtain
from vector autoregressions are broadly consistent with the expectation that the real GDP growth of
oil importing economies suﬀers from increases in oil prices in both linear and non-linear models. With
regard to the two net oil exporters in our sample, Norway beneﬁts from oil price hikes while in the UK a
rise in oil prices is found to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on GDP growth. These contrasting results
for oil exporting countries can be traced to a sharper real exchange-rate appreciation in the case of the
UK. In the case of net oil importer Japan, the results obtained using the optimal order of the model (i.e.
four lags) indicate a positive association between oil prices and real performance. This unexpected result
can be rationalised in terms of the peculiar circumstances undergone by the Japanese economy during
the period under study. Furthermore, the unexpected result is not robust, being reversed in the case of
a second-order vector autoregression.
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types of non-linear models, namely the asymmetric and scaled speciﬁcations. By using these approaches,
we ﬁnd that a decline in oil prices aﬀects signiﬁcantly only a few countries. For instance, we observe that
a fall in oil prices have a positive impact on the US economy (after the ﬁrst year following the oil shock)
and on the British economy, while it has a negative eﬀect in Canada. The latter result can be explained
by the fact that large decreases in oil prices took place after the early 1980s, which is when the Canadian
economy was switching from a net oil importer into a net oil exporter.
Inspection of the conﬁdence bands around impulse responses allows us to conclude that the non-linear
models yield results that are comparably accurate. Moreover, the accuracy of impulse responses in the
non-linear speciﬁcations tends to be higher than in the case of the linear model, the latter only appearing
to dominate in the case of the UK. Additionally, information criteria indicate that the scaled speciﬁcation
performs somewhat better than the other models. This indicates that, for the analysis of output growth,
it is important to consider the environment in which oil price changes take place. In particular, the scaled
model, by controlling for the conditional variability of oil shocks, highlights that a given oil price change
has a larger impact in a context of previously stable prices than in one of volatile market behaviour.
With regard to the size of the responses, non-linear speciﬁcations tend to yield larger real impacts
of oil price shocks compared with the linear model. For the sake of concreteness, let us focus on the
preferred (scaled) speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that in the US the output loss resulting from a 100% oil price
hike increases from around 3.5% in the linear approach to 5% in the scaled case. Among the other oil
importing countries, the respective increase in the output loss arising from the same shock is from around
2% to a range of 3 to 5% in the case of individual euro area countries, from less than 1% to 2% in the
case of the euro area as a whole, and from very small values to around 1% in Canada. Among the oil
exporters in our sample, in the UK the corresponding rise in the output loss from the same shock is from
less than 2% to over 2%, while in Norway the output gain increases from 1% to more than 2%.
Our variance decomposition analysis indicates that oil price shocks are a considerable source of volatil-
ity for many of the variables in the model. For real GDP, oil prices shocks are, together with monetary
shocks, the largest source of variation other than the variable itself for most of the countries. Finally, we
ﬁnd no evidence of instability of the oil price coeﬃcients in the GDP equations for any speciﬁcation but
the linear model of the euro area.
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Section 2 analyses the order of integration of the diﬀerent series used in the paper on the basis of four
diﬀerent unit root tests in addition to the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. These tests
are the DFGLS and  tests of Elliott et al. (1996), and the DFGLSu and  tests of Elliott (1999),
both of which potentially yield much larger power than the standard ADF test.
Consider the data generating process of the form:
 = 0 + 
 = 1−1 + -
where {0} is the deterministic component, 0 =( 1 )0 ,a n d{-} is an unobserved stationary zero-mean-
error process whose spectral density function is positive at zero frequency. It is our aim to ﬁnd methods
for testing whether  can be considered to be integrated of order zero, or simply (0) To do so, we test
whether 1 =1(i.e.  is integrated of order one, or simply (1))a g a i n s tt h e|1|  1 (i.e.  is (0)).
The DFGLS assesses whether 2 =0(i.e.  is (1)) against the one-sided alternative that 20 (i.e.










− +  (A.1)
where 
¯ 
 , the locally demeaned and detrended process under the local alternative of ¯ 2 =1+¯ !" with
¯ 0,i sg i v e nb y :

¯ 
 =  − ˆ '0
being ˆ ' the least-square regression coeﬃcient of 
 on 0
 (denoting by  the lag operator):

 =[ 1(1 − ¯ 2)2(1 − ¯ 2)]
0
 =[ 01(1 − ¯ 2)02(1 − ¯ 2)0]
The  test is deﬁned as follows:
 =[ 




(¯ 2) and 
(1) are the sums of squared error from a GLS regression with 2 =¯ 2 and 2 =1 ,
respectively. Let ˆ 3





	!(1 − ˆ 2(1))2
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2
	 =( " − ))−1 P
=	+1 ˆ 2
, ˆ 2(1) =
P	
=1 ˆ 2,a n dˆ 2, {ˆ 2
} obtained from the regression (,1).
The DFGLSu and the  are deﬁned similarly to the DFGLSu and the  respectively, with the
diﬀerence that the initial observation of the locally detrended process is now drawn from the unconditional
distribution (i.e. 
 =[ ( 1− ¯ 2)1
21(1 − ¯ 2)2(1 − ¯ 2)] and 0
 =[ ( 1− ¯ 2)1
201(1 − ¯ 2)02(1 −
¯ 2)0]) (See Elliott, 1999).
Elliott et al. (1996) and Elliott (1999) report the asymptotic critical values for both the model with
a constant and the model with a constant and a deterministic trend.55 In addition, we use, in the no
deterministic parameters case for the DFGLS test, the standard Dickey-Fuller critical values.
55When the DFGLS and the  tests are used, the authors suggest setting ¯ 	 = −7 for the model with a constant,
and ¯ 	 = −13
5 for the model with a constant and a deterministic trend. Likewise, when the DFGLSu and  tests are
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The data used in this paper are from 1972:III to 2001:IV. The corresponding sources are as follows:
Real GDP: IFS, line 99bvr except in the following cases: for Japan, OECD data (line NAGVVO01);
for Norway, OECD data (line 582027KSA) up to 1978:I, and from that date on (line NAGVTT01.NCALSA);
and for the euro area the data come from Fagan et al. (2001) up to 2000:IV and from then on the OECD
data (line EUVNBQRSA 1995.S1).
Nominal Oil Price: IFS, UK Brent price (line 11276AAZZF).
US Producer Price Index:I F S ,l i n e6 3 .
Real Oil Price:N o m i n a lO i lP r i c ed e ﬂated by the US Producer Price Index.
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate: OECD data from Main Economic Indicators, which is based on
consumer price indices, line CCRETT01.IXOB, except for the euro area. For the euro area, the data come
from Fagan et al. (2001) up to 1998:IV and from then on the data come from ECB’s DESIS database
(line EFFCPI.IND). This series is instead based on GDP deﬂator indices.
Short-term Interest Rate: IFS, line 60c (Treasury Bill Rate) except in the following cases: for
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Norway, line 60b (Money Market Rate); and for the euro area, the data come
from Fagan et al. (2001) up to 2000:IV, and from then on the monthly data come from ECB’s DESIS
database (line IR_EURIBOR_3M.AV.REUTERS). The latter series was aggregated from monthly into
quarterly data by taking averages.
Long-term Interest Rate: IFS, line 61 (Government Bond Yield) except in the following cases:
for Japan, from 2001:I onwards, OECD data (line IRLTGV02.ST); and for the euro area, the data come
from Fagan et al. (2001) up to 2000:IV, and from then on the monthly data come from ECB’s DESIS
database (line IR_L.AV.REUTERS). The latter series was aggregated from monthly into quarterly data
by taking averages.
Wage: OECD data, line LCEAMN01 except in the following cases: for Japan, OECD data (LCEAMN03)
(these data are adjusted for seasonality by means of X11 Multiplicative Adjustment Method); for US and
Canada, IFS data (line 65EY); and for the euro area, the data come from Fagan et al. (2001) up to
1994:IV, and from then on the data come from Eurostat-ESA database, line UNLACO.0000.TTTT.D.U.I
(Unit Labour Cost).
Consumer Price Index: OECD data, line CPALTT01 except in the following cases: for Japan,
line CPALCY01 (these data are adjusted for seasonality by means of X11 Multiplicative Adjustment
Method); and for the euro area, the data come from Fagan et al. (2001) up to 2000:IV, and from then
on the data from IFS database (line 64h).
Real Wage: Nominal Wage deﬂated by the corresponding CPI.
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Results of unit-root tests. Output and Exchange Rate variables 
 
              Model with constant and trend                                       Model with constant                    Model without constant 
 
  ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS 
GDP in Levels                
CAN  -2.67 -1.35 25.88 -2.07  8.98  -1.34 2.44  336.17  -0.57  132.42  4.41  4.41 
FRA  -3.20*  -1.79 13.72 -2.45  4.44  -0.71 2.13  315.46  -0.21  87.03 4.01  4.01 
GER -2.95  -3.04** 3.50*** -2.98*  1.93*** -0.27  1.39  161.78  -0.20  68.25  2.59  2.59 
ITA  -1.87 -0.76 39.40 -1.38  14.68 -2.10 2.03  322.98  -0.57  115.63  4.33  4.33 
JAP  0.94  -0.09 29.13 -0.28  15.48 -1.74 0.84  170.74  -0.63  83.48 2.20  2.20 
NOR  -3.18*  -1.12 20.83 -1.97  5.81  -2.22 0.91  107.90  -0.75  33.37 2.35  2.35 
UK -2.42  -2.42  4.58** -2.43  2.53** -0.17  1.28  142.99 -0.87  28.66  3.20  3.20 
US  -3.37*  -3.41**  3.13*  -3.41**  1.62***  0.18 1.60 233.82  -0.53  42.98  4.24  4.24 
EA -3.49**  -2.48  6.53  -3.19*  2.36** -0.53  1.96  301.0  -0.16  78.18  4.19  4.19 
GDP in First Log-differences              
CAN -7.09*** -5.41*** 2.73***  -6.69***  1.25***  -7.03*** -3.31*** 1.93***  -6.91***  1.50***  -1.75*  -1.75* 
FRA  -5.41*** -4.96*** 1.40***  -4.95***  0.80***  -5.42*** -4.44*** 0.77***  -546***  0.69***  -2.67***  -2.67*** 
GER -4.02**  -3.72*** 6.53*  -3.80***  3.50  -4.24*** -3.48*** 1.47***  -4.27***  1.57***  -3.05***  -3.05*** 
ITA -6.45***  -4.88***  1.04*** -6.20***  0.00*** -3.71***  -1.86*  9.48  -3.59***  1.22*** -1.99**  -1.99** 
JAP  -4.31***  -3.46**  4.68** -3.63**  2.39** -3.67***  -1.77* 6..12  -3.75*** 4.83*  -2.84***  -2.84*** 
NOR  -3.48**  -1.68  107.49 -2.08  28.51  -3.17**  -0.14  122.21 -2.24  26.23  -1.88*  1.88* 
UK  -3.69**  -2.84*  22.65 -3.38** 5.07  -3.82***  -1.41 23.03 -3.74***  2.64***  -2.00**  -2.00** 
US  -3.47**  -2.25 13.57 -2.92  2.23**  -3.48**  -1.10 13.49 -3.36***  0.52***  -1.51  -1.51 
EA  -5.21*** -5.14*** 0.54***  -4.97***  0.35***  -5.22*** -5.25*** 0.14***  -5.23***  0.28***  -1.66*  -1.66* 
REER in Levels               
CAN  -2.28 -2.34 6.00* -2.36  3.32* -0.46 0.56  29.52 -0.62  23.53 -1.53  -1.53 
FRA -3.85** -3.66***  2.28*** -3.83***  1.12*** -1.82  -1.63*  3.54*  -1.94  5.14*  -0.91  -0.91 
GER -3.00  -2.96** 3.70*** -3.03*  1.99*** -2.48  -2.40** 1.77*** -2.52*  2.95*** -1.44  -1.44 
ITA  -2.53 -2.00 10.61 -2.29  4.93  -2.51 -1.48 5.60  -2.48*  5.00* -0.58  -0.58 
JAP -2.81  -2.57  2.17*** -2.81  0.84*** -1.52  -0.15  32.69  -1.39  20.34  0.84  0.84 
NOR  -2.80 -1.84 11.81 -2.38  3.78  -2.10 -1.57 4.84  -2.09  4.37**  0.14  0.14 
UK -2.62  -2.60* 4.88** -2.67  2.18** -2.33  -2.45**  1.69***  -2.43  3.20  0.21  0.21 
US  -2.17 -2.11 6.53* -2.25  3.34* -2.26 -1.66*  4.25* -2.25  3.84**  0.13  0.13 
EA  -2.00 -1.42 17.35 -2.04  7.79  -2.30 0.05  66.86 -1.99  41.22 1.38  1.38 
REER in First Log-differences              
CAN -4.81*** -4.42*** 2.05***  -4.57***  1.01***  -4.79*** -3.52*** 1.43***  -4.81***  0.93***  -4.52***  -4.52*** 
FRA  -5.59*** -4.79*** 0.15***  -5.45***  0.04***  -5.58*** -3.23*** 1.06***  -5.46***  0.04***  -5.51***  -5.51*** 
GER -4.87*** -4.91*** 4.08**  -4.87***  2.13**  -4.90*** -4.89*** 1.01***  -4.92***  2.33**  -4.78***  -4.78*** 
ITA  -5.29*** -5.19*** 0.56***  -5.30***  1.09***  -5.29*** -5.26*** 2.03**  -5.32***  1.09***  -5.28***  -5.28*** 
JAP  -5.25*** -5.28*** 0.28***  -5.25***  0.16***  -5.24*** -5.25*** 0.08***  -5.27***  0.16***  -5.17***  -5.17*** 
NOR -9.43*** -9.33*** 1.60***  -9.45***  0.87***  -9.44*** -8.46*** 0.45***  -9.41***  0.87***  -9.47***  -9.47*** 
UK  -3.64**  -3.67*** 0.16***  -3.66**  0.10***  -3.66*** -3.65*** 0.06***  -3.66***  0.11***  -3.63***  -3.63*** 
US  -3.61**  -3.59*** 5.50**  -3.63**  2.97**  -3.57*** -3.10*** 2.02**  -3.58***  3.17**  -3.60***  -3.60*** 
EA  -5.37*** -5.38*** 0.18***  -5.37***  0.10***  -7.74*** -7.68*** 0.45***  -7.77***  0.92***  -7.55***  -7.55*** 
 
Notes:  Sample is 1972:II-2001:IV for the variables in levels, and starts one quarter later for the variables in first differences. We use data-driven lag selection 
procedures for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, taking 1.645 as the critical value used for significance of lagged terms and 8 as the maximum number of lags 
allowed in these procedures into account. The same number of lags is used in the other tests considered. We denote with one/two/three asterisks the rejection of the 
null hypothesis at a 10%/5%/1% critical levels.  
 
Critical levels used for ADF test are the following: 
-  In the model with constant and trend: -4.05 (1%), -3.45 (5%) and -3.15 (10%). 
-  In the model with constant: -3.50 (1%), -2.89 (5%) and –2.58 (10%). 
-  In the model without constant: -2.59 (1%), -1.94 (5%) and –1.62 (10%). 
Critical levels used for DFGLS test are the following:  
-  In the model with constant and trend: -3.48 (1%), -2.89 (5%) and –2.57 (10%). 
-  In the model with constant: -2.58 (1%), -1.95 (5%) and –1.62 (10%). 
-  In the model without constant: -2.58 (1%), -1.95 (5%) and –1.62 (10%). 
Critical levels used for PT test are the following:  
-  In the model with constant and trend: 3.96 (1%), 5.62 (5%) and 6.89 (10%). 
-  In the model with constant: 1.99 (1%), 3.26 (5%) and 4.48 (10%). 
Critical levels used for DFGLSu test are the following:  
-  In the model with constant and trend: -3.71 (1%), -3.17 (5%) and –2.91 (10%). 
-  In the model with constant: -3.28 (1%), -2.73 (5%) and –2.46 (10%). 
Critical levels used for QT test are the following:  
-  In the model with constant and trend: 2.05 (1%), 2.85 (5%) and 3.44 (10%). 
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Results of unit-root tests. Price variables 
 
              Model with constant and trend                                       Model with constant                    Model without constant 
 
  ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS 
Real Oil Price in Level            
All  -2.99 -1.80 17.40 -2.55  6.78  -2.58 -1.41 8.06  -2.49  6.71  -0.06  -0.06 
Real Oil Price in First Log-differences            
All  -8.47***  -8.31***  1.23*** -8.17***  0.70*** 9.99*** -10.0***  0.52*** -9.92***  0.97*** -10.0*** -10.0*** 
CPI in Levels              
CAN  -1.64 -0.94 4.74**  -1.44  3.51  -3.65***  -0.59 11.19 -1.59  27.69 0.35  0.35 
FRA  -1.66 -1.18 5.44**  -1.60  4.39  -3.34**  -0.46 15.70 -1.49  30.06 0.39  0.39 
GER  -1.76 -1.29 13.61 -1.59  6.22  -1.85 0.75  106.64  -0.22  40.41 1.50  1.50 
ITA -2.24  -1.79  0.08*** -2.08  0.37*** -3.39** -0.80  11.57  -1.47  30.51  -0.32  -0.32 
JAP  -5.25***  -0.75 22.41 -1.30  10.50 -5.49***  -0.10 67.12 -1.30  50.16 0.41  0.41 
NOR  -0.76  -0.79  9.40 -1.15  5.76 -3.00**  -0.19  22.42  -1.07  25.48  0.52  0.52 
UK  -2.69 -0.69 19.28 -1.37  9.24  -4.40***  0.01  37.23 -1.36  35.74 0.96  0.96 
US  -1.36 -0.55 17.95 -0.98  8.92  -3.11**  0.11  44.89 -0.93  32.90 0.84  0.84 
EA  -1.89  -1.76  1.00 -1.84  2.77 -2.35  -0.20  49.63  -0.69  41.63  0.23  0.23 
CPI in First Log-differences            
CAN  -3.19*  -2.15 18.04 -2.79  2.63**  -1.21 -1.35 8.51  -1.33  14.88 -1.16  -1.16 
FRA  -3.81**  -2.49 9.00  -3.33**  3.34* -1.30 -1.34 6.51  -1.36  12.57 -1.22  -1.22 
GER  -2.89  -2.91* 4.15** -2.75  2.24** -2.38  -1.91* 8.10  -2.49*  11.42  -1.95** -1.95** 
ITA  -2.43 -1.54 41.47 -1.85  11.29 -0.74 -1.15 16.86 -0.93  30.17 -1.30  -1.30 
JAP -3.56** -3.09** 6.26*  -3.46**  2.84**  -3.97***  -3.00***  13.50  -3.79*** 25.69  -4.54***  -4.54*** 
NOR  -3.34*  -2.58*  8.34 -3.07* 3.29*  -1.35  -1.27  7.35 -1.40  13.23  -1.38 -1.38 
UK  -3.37* -2.65* 6.00*  -3.16*  1.03***  -1.88  -1.91* 4.15*  1.99  7.88  -1.57  -1.57 
US  -3.54**  -2.49 7.12  -3.24**  1.73***  -1.64 -1.56 5.62  -1.66  9.77  -1.05  -1.05 
EA  -1.90 -1.74 26.39 -.91  8.67  -1.27 -1.25 14.47 -1.39  27.26 -1.79*  -1.79* 
CPI  in  Second  Differences            
CAN  -9.62***  -3.39**  7.55 -5.22***  1.98***  -9.62***  -1.51  8.07 -9.48***  0.05***  -9.64***  -9.64*** 
FRA -6.23***  -3.24**  11.07  -5.09***  0.74*** -6.25***  -1.60  8.77  -5.78***  0.05*** -6.23*** -6.23*** 
GER  -5.31***  -2.65*  48.55 -2.84  21.44 -5.29***  -1.79*  25.49 -5.10***  3.39**  -5.23***  -5.23*** 
ITA  -7.41*** -4.42*** 0.15***  -6.25***  7.23  -7.46*** -2.47**  4.59  -6.97**  14.51  -7.38***  -7.38*** 
JAP  -6.74***  -1.28 94.63 -2.18  25.54 -6.37***  -0.37 65.97 -3.98***  1.73***  -5.91***  -5.91*** 
NOR -13.1*** -9.28*** 0.14***  -9.44***  0.04***  -13.1*** -6.34*** 0.55***  -10.5***  0.03***  -13.1***  -13.1*** 
UK  -6.11*** -5.62*** 0.94***  -6.10***  2.91*  -6.12*** -4.61*** 0.56***  -6.10***  2.94***  -6.13***  -6.13*** 
US  -13.7*** -11.9*** 0.71***  -12.6***  0.36***  -13.7*** -9.43*** 0.39***  -13.7***  0.33***  -13.7***  -13.7*** 
EA  -6.31***  -2.99**  14.05 -4.79***  0.06***  -6.33***  -1.47 11.68 -4.87***  0.13***  -6.19***  -6.19*** 
Real Wages in Levels             
CAN -3.32*  -1.41  5.48**  -1.91  3.95  -3.81*** -0.11  23.19  -1.00  22.79  0.59  0.59 
FRA  -3.28*  -1.78 2.80***  -2.21  3.90  -3.57 -0.41 17.90 -1.23  27.70 0.16  0.16 
GER  -2.00 -1.03 6.78* -1.36  3.96  -2.00 0.19  71.11 -0.34  38.23 0.85  0.85 
ITA -2.55  -1.86  9E-4***  -1.94  1.44*** -3.25** -0.75  35.78  -1.30  50.94  -0.47  -0.47 
JAP  -4.33***  -0.76 30.30 -0.95  13.97 -3.61***  0.34  123.5 -0.73  60.48 0.69  0.69 
NOR  -2.72 -1.12 10.23 -1.76  4.52  -3.15**  0.17  30.36 -0.78  18.85 0.97  0.97 
UK  -2.82 -0.60 18.20 -1.18  8.63  -5.27***  0.09  33.50 -0.88  24.40 0.31  0.31 
US  -4.19***  -2.16  0.77*** -2.81*  1.31*** -3.03** -0.28  9.25  -0.98  13.33  0.45  0.45 
EA  -2.99 -1.03 14.76 -1.43  8.61  -4.44***  0.24  45.69 -0.74  30.81 0.71  0.71 
Real Wages in First Log-differences            
CAN  -2.77  -2.36  8.84 -2.54  3.51 -1.42  -1.16  9.47 -1.43  16.07  -1.25 -1.25 
FRA  -2.12 -2.15 11.53 -2.15  6.38  -1.12 -0.33 29.05 -1.11  26.57 -1.27  -1.27 
GER  -2.38 -1.91 60.09 -2.14  28.49 -1.68 0.11  58.45 -1.62  50.87 -1.75* -1.75* 
ITA  -2.15 -1.51 74.97 -1.72  23.27 -0.92 -1.38 26.07 -1.14  49.92 -1.83* -1.83* 
JAP -3.21*  -3.37** 15.27  -3.32**  6.39  -2.52  -2.15** 11.67  -2.60*  20.96  -2.64***  -2.64*** 
NOR  -3.05 -2.83*  13.88 -3.03*  4.93  -1.86 -0.63 24.67 -1.78  17.66 -1.20  -1.20 
UK  -4.78***  -4.55***  1.76*** -4.38***  0.68*** -1.31  -0.50  21.61  -1.27  18.42  -0.93  -0.93 
US  -1.73 -1.46 24.42 -1.59  12.32 -1.04 -0.81 13.59 -1.02  25.51 -0.93  -0.93 
EA -3.69***  -2.58* 6.65*  -3.08*  2.08** -1.58  -1.55  5.42  -1.60  10.83  -1.31  -1.31 
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Results of unit-root tests. Monetary variables 
 
              Model with constant and trend                                     Model with constant                    Model without constant 
 
  ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU  QT ADF  DFGLS 
Short-term Interest Rate in Levels              
CAN  -2.34 -1.15 22.80 -1.79  7.72  -1.33 -1.07 8.88  -1.36  9.22  -0.72  -0.72 
FRA  -2.64 -1.30 22.52 -2.00  7.52  -1.20 -1.16 7.68  -1.26  10.80 -0.74  0.74 
GER  -2.94  -3.13**  7.92 -3.09* 3.44 -2.98**  -3.02***  2.71**  -3.10**  3.78**  -1.79*  -1.79* 
ITA  -2.82 -1.13 29.28 -2.04  10.31 -1.29 -1.02 10.64 -1.30  12.59 -0.61  -0.61 
JAP -3.58** -2.83*  6.76*  -3.42**  1.01*** -2.01  -2.02** 2.91*** -2.04  5.43*  -1.28  -1.28 
NOR  -1.74 -0.89 46.48 -1.25  16.70 -1.34 -0.71 25.43 -1.29  16.44 -0.39  -0.39 
UK  -3.55**  -.93 13.66  -2.99* 4.91 -2.43  -1.62*  5.26 -2.36  5.47*  -0.80 -0.80 
US  -2.17 -1.34 17.02 -1.87  5.54  -1.34 -1.27 6.41  -1.43  7.26  -0.88  -0.88 
EA  -2.06 -1.12 27.20 -1.63  9.65  -0.97 -1.09 9.66  -1.10  12.15 -0.83  -0.83 
Short-term Interest Rate in First Differences            
CAN -4.92*** -4.79*** 0.08***  -4.66***  0.01***  -4.72*** -4.67*** 0.02***  -4.69***  0.01***  -4.74***  -4.74*** 
FRA  -6.02*** -5.94*** 0.01***  -6.00***  0.00***  -5.91*** -5.85*** 0.01***  -5.90***  0.01***  -5.92***  -5.92*** 
GER -5.79*** -5.35*** 1.85***  -5.81***  0.17***  -5.82*** -3.65*** 1.97***  -5.82***  0.17***  -5.80***  -5.80*** 
ITA  -4.85*** -4.44*** 0.12***  -4.94***  1.35***  -6.50*** -5.62*** 0.18***  -6.46***  0.10***  -6.52***  -6.52*** 
JAP  -4.60*** -4.66*** 0.36***  -4.68***  0.38***  -4.67*** -4.35*** 0.00***  -4.68***  0.36***  -4.51***  -4.51*** 
NOR  -5.99***  -2.32 18.82 -4.07***  0.53***  -5.90***  -1.00 17.64 -5.01***  0.42***  -5.93***  -5.93*** 
UK  -4.52*** -4.41*** 1.35***  -4.32***  0.55***  -4.46*** -4.03*** 0.04***  -4.49***  0.70***  -4.45***  -4.45*** 
US  -4.60*** -4.33*** 0.06***  -4.18***  0.12***  -4.51*** -3.89*** 0.08***  -4.51***  0.00***  -4.52***  -4.52*** 
EA  -5.69*** -5.53*** 0.27***  -5.68***  0.07***  -5.58*** -5.26*** 0.14***  -5.60***  0.12***  -5.59***  -5.59*** 
Long-term Interest Rate in Levels               
CAN  -2.10 -1.10 27.42 -1.67  10.69 -1.07 -1.01 9.23  -1.11  13.02 -0.53  -0.53 
FRA  -2.28 -1.33 21.98 -1.86  8.84  -1.00 -1.08 7.21  -1.07  12.99 -0.68  -0.68 
GER  -3.23*  -2.91** 4.22**  -3.19**  1.87*** -2.15  -2.14** 2.33**  -2.22  4.16**  -0.93  -0.93 
ITA  -2.38 -1.43 22.28 -2.07  9.46  -1.41 -1.26 7.22  -1.42  11.01 -0.63  -0.63 
JAP -4.09***  -2.79*  5.27**  -3.61**  1.96*** -1.09  -0.86  7.96  -1.16  11.33  -1.00  -1.00 
NOR  -1.79 -1.10 24.24 -1.47  11.08 -1.27 -1.06 8.26  -1.26  11.47 -0.41  -0.41 
UK  -4.04**  -1.44 24.20 -2.81  7.57  -0.90 -1.03 8.64  -1.00  14.63 -0.72  -0.72 
US  -2.08 -1.21 24.22 -1.72  9.57  -1.20 -1.11 8.11  -1.23  11.56 -0.55  -0.55 
EA  -2.42 -1.54 10.67 -2.07  3.92  -1.46 -1.39 3.85* -1.52  4.98* -0.75  -0.75 
Long-term Interest Rate in First Differences            
CAN -5.48*** -5.27*** 0.31***  -5.47***  0.09***  -5.24*** -3.79*** 0.84***  -5.25***  0.19***  -5.25***  -5.25*** 
FRA  -5.38*** -4.75*** 1.34***  -5.31***  0.42***  -5.24*** -4.08*** 0.62***  -5.22***  0.46***  -5.25***  -5.25*** 
GER  -3.36*  -2.39  8.32 -2.83  2.53**  -3.39**  -1.60  6.76 -3.35**  1.24***  -3.28***  -3.28*** 
ITA  -6.75*** -6.29*** 2.10***  -6.70***  1.09***  -6.55*** -5.91*** 061***  -6.55***  1.09***  -6.58***  -6.58*** 
JAP  -4.54*** -4.13*** 3.89***  -4.44***  1.89***  -4.48*** -3.71*** 1.35***  -4.49***  1.86***  -4.46***  -4.46*** 
NOR  -3.52** -3.19** 4.93**  -3.41**  1.96*** -3.16** -3.01***  1.76*** -3.10**  3.11**  -3.17***  -3.17*** 
UK  -9.19*** -8.57*** 1.66***  -9.12***  0.89***  -9.06*** -6.44*** 0.69***  -9.05***  0.96***  -9.07***  -9.07*** 
US  -5.16*** -5.20*** 0.61***  -5.21***  0.33***  -5.35*** -5.18*** 0.08***  -5.37***  0.10***  -5.36***  -5.36*** 
EA  -3.07  -3.06** 4.65*** -3.09*  2.40*  -2.88*  -2.87***  1.62*** -2.90**  3.22**  -2.87*** -2.87*** 
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Wald Test
p-values of the asymptotic distribution Chi-Squared are reported for the different models considered.
H0: The oil price coefficients are jointly equal to zero in the GDP equation of the VAR model.
LINEAR ASYMMETRIC SCALED OIL PRICE NET OIL PRICE
ot ot
+ ot
- SOPIt SOPDt NOPI t
Country/ Region
US 0.79505 0.81229 0.37737 0.47193 0.62892 0.33489
Euro area 0.33712 0.01127** 0.02595** 0.00088*** 0.01765** 0.00048***
Japan 0.27980 0.46182 0.22198 0.33901 0.32490 0.32291
Canada 0.16691 0.82090 0.15353 0.72218 0.03244** 0.96115
France 0.18320 0.07699* 0.57619 0.05946* 0.53181 0.07422*
Italy 0.19089 0.12767 0.62054 0.11419 0.69565 0.08848*
Germany 0.32321 0.05971* 0.41479 0.03122** 0.51590 0.00951***
UK 0.94260 0.49526 0.24439 0.28650 0.74116 0.20778
Norway 0.53323 0.63854 0.06257* 0.67749 0.86550 0.84935
Note: One/two/three asterisks mean a p-value less than 10%/5%/1%.
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Likelihood Ratio Test
Let the p-th order VAR model be rewritten as follows:
y1t = k1  + D1’ x1t  + D2’ x2t + 1t
ot = k2  + C1’ x1t  + C2’ x2t + 2t
where y1t is the vector of variables other than ot, x1t contains lags of y1t, ot represents the real oil price change, and x2t
contains lags of ot.
H0: All oil price coefficients are jointly zero in all equations of the system but its own equation, i.e. D2 = 0.
The statistic is as follows:
2  [L (1) - L (2) ]~ª 2(rows(y1t)   p)
where L (1) and L (2) denote the value of the log likelihood function of the unrestricted and restricted models,
respectively.
p-values of the asymptotic distribution are reported for the different specifications considered.
LINEAR ASYMMETRIC SCALED OIL PRICE NET OIL PRICE
ot ot
+ ot
- SOPIt SOPDt NOPI t
Country/ Region
US 0.18515 0.00078*** 0.01285** 0.00402*** 0.31146 0.00284***
Euro area 6.6E-005*** 2.5E-007*** 0.17735 9.8E-008*** 0.13732 1.9E-006***
Japan 0.00561*** 0.00069*** 0.61894 6.9E-006*** 0.10267 4.6E-006***
Canada 5.4E-005*** 5.9E-005*** 0.01947** 2.2E-005*** 0.00504*** 0.04724**
France 0.02715** 5.6E-008*** 0.31297 1.3E-006*** 0.80259 6.4E-006***
Italy 9.0E-005*** 4.0E-007*** 0.35895 9.6E-007*** 0.38396 1.8E-006***
Germany 1.8E-006*** 7.3E-008*** 0.28881 9.4E-007*** 0.13869 1.7E-008***
UK 0.00352*** 6.9E-010*** 0.03516** 8.0E-011*** 0.02535** 1.0E-010***
Norway 0.02189** 0.00146*** 0.26545 1.2E-007*** 0.05412* 0.00971***
Note: One/two/three asterisks mean a p-value less than 10%/5%/1%.
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Granger Causality in a Multivariate Context
(Block-Exogeneity Test)
We consider two groups of variables in the VAR, as represented by the (n1  1) vector y1t and the (n2  1) vector y2t. We rewrite the pth-
order VAR as follows:
y1t = c1  + A1’ x1t  + A2’ x2t  + 1t             (1)
y2t = c2  + B1’ x1t  + B2’ x2t  + 2t                     (2)
where x1t is an (n1 p  1) vector containing lags of y1t, and x2t is an (n2 p  1) vector containing lags of y2t.
y1  (y2) is block-exogenous in the time series sense with respect to y2 (y1)  when A2 = 0  (B1 = 0).
The statistic for testing the null hypothesis A2 = 0 is the following:
T  {log |*11(0)| - log |*11|} ~ª 2(n1n2 p)
where *11 is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from OLS estimation of (1) and *11(0) that of the residuals from OLS
estimation of (1) when A2 = 0.
The test statistic for H0: B1 = 0 can be constructed analogously.
There is no relation at all between y1 and y2 when A2 = 0, B1 = 0, and 21 = 0.
p-values of these three tests are reported.
Linear Asymmetric Scaled Net
                                     y1t
Null Hypotheses
ot ot
+    SOPIt
 NOPIt
US A2= 0 0.07235* 0.00077*** 0.01374** 0.00538***
B1=0 0.28218 0.02295** 0.27797 0.11449
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 0.00060*** 3.4E-008*** 0.00062*** 4.6E-005***
EA A2=0 0.04546** 0.03223** 0.03268** 0.05025*
B1=0 0.08950* 1.9E-005*** 3.3E-006*** 3.0E-006***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 0.00097*** 1.5E-007*** 7.8E-008*** 1.8E-007***
JAP A2=0 0.00099*** 4.3E-005*** 0.00010*** 6.0E-006***
B1=0 0.00696*** 0.00099*** 6.9E-005*** 1.8E-005***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 3.2E-007*** 9.3E-011*** 5.6E-011*** 1.2E-015***
CAN A2=0 0.09702* 0.01380** 0.00823*** 0.33964
B1=0 5.7E-05*** 3.3E-005*** 1.6E-005*** 0.04858**
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 0.00025*** 4.3E-006*** 3.3E-006*** 0.06119*
FRA A2=0 0.04153** 0.01059** 0.00369*** 0.00220***
B1=0 0.03311** 0.00015*** 6.6E-005*** 1.9E-005***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 1.5E-005*** 2.2E-008*** 6.9E-009*** 7.3E-009***
ITA A2=0 0.16937 0.03025** 0.02091** 0.01252**
B1=0 0.00012*** 1.1E-006*** 2.5E-007*** 4.4E-006***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 0.00010*** 1.8E-007*** 4.5E-008*** 2.0E-007***
GER A2=0 2.4E-005*** 1.4E-009*** 6.0E-010*** 3.3E-010***
B1=0 4.8E-006*** 1.1E-008*** 5.8E-008*** 3.7E-008***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 7.2E-011*** 1.2E-017*** 6.0E-017*** 3.8E-017***
UK A2=0 0.02953** 2.3E-005*** 2.1E-005*** 0.00127***
B1=0 0.00440*** 2.7E-005*** 8.1E-008*** 1.6E-010***
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 5.3E-005*** 1.6E-011*** 2.7E-012*** 1.1E-012***
NOR A2=0 0.98041 0.94354 0.95500 0.90139
B1=0 0.02193** 0.00862*** 0.00271*** 0.01035**
A2=0, B1=0, 21=0 0.39732 0.20278 0.12006 0.18429
Notes: One/two/three asterisks mean a p-value less than 10%/5%/1%.
 We use both positive and negative oil price changes (that is, o
+ and o
-) in the US, the UK and Canada.
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Relative Performance of the Models
LINEAR ASYMMETRIC SCALED NET
Country/ Region
US AIC 19.746 26.122 14.051 19.057
BIC 24.618 32.459 18.924 23.929
Euro area AIC 18.273 17.854 12.627 17.751
BIC 21.949 22.726 17.500 22.623
Japan AIC 25.688 24.970 19.749 24.574
BIC 30.560 29.842 24.621 29.446
Canada AIC 21.648 28.236 17.798 21.060
BIC 26.520 34.572 24.135 24.736
France AIC 19.313 18.640 13.398 18.499
BIC 22.989 22.316 17.074 22.175
Italy AIC 24.028 23.354 18.104 23.244
BIC 27.704 27.030 21.780 26.919
Germany AIC 19.858 18.977 13.809 18.897
BIC 24.730 23.850 18.682 23.769
UK AIC 25.626 31.834 21.352 24.521
BIC 30.499 38.171 27.689 29.394
Norway AIC 26.758 26.220 21.106 26.101
BIC 30.434 29.896 25.978 29.777
Note: In the asymmetric specification for the US, the UK, and Canada, and in the scaled specification for the UK and Canada, we use
an eight-variable system which includes both oil price increase and decrease measures.
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Estimated Variance Decomposition at the 12-period horizon: Linear Case
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (GDP) US 64,34 10,91 5,75 11,28 2,28 1,94 3,50
Euro area 69,08 7,51 3,39 9,60 1,94 4,03 4,45
Japan 75,58 1,59 4,20 3,13 3,05 5,75 6,69
Canada 59,33 4,91 8,78 17,72 3,98 1,53 3,74
France 78,71 5,29 2,39 7,39 0,57 1,46 4,19
Italy 66,45 6,75 1,01 4,50 0,30 16,87 4,13
Germany 80,21 3,72 3,36 4,19 3,91 3,63 0,98
Norway 78,33 4,03 1,01 5,37 1,31 5,93 4,02
UK 74,21 5,94 4,11 3,96 4,61 3,10 4,07
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (o) US 3,83 74,57 2,24 4,79 4,16 1,41 9,00
Euro area 3,12 76,46 5,33 4,41 0,95 4,17 5,56
Japan 3,61 67,21 4,56 3,30 7,66 6,27 7,39
Canada 6,88 77,64 4,71 2,48 1,36 0,40 6,52
France 5,96 75,59 11,79 2,08 0,20 3,71 0,66
Italy 3,03 81,64 3,40 1,84 2,91 5,62 1,57
Germany 4,22 64,66 2,31 11,15 3,53 2,45 11,68
Norway 0,78 93,90 0,82 0,42 0,63 1,99 1,44
UK 11,99 69,79 2,07 5,51 1,50 4,26 4,88
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (Infl) US 6,09 10,75 54,22 8,83 10,69 5,64 3,78
Euro area 4,81 17,20 56,66 9,42 3,75 3,35 4,82
Japan 22,40 6,35 44,12 2,25 4,80 14,69 5,39
Canada 7,19 5,29 71,21 4,94 3,58 4,10 3,69
France 2,38 8,94 77,64 4,62 0,72 4,69 1,02
Italy 4,21 5,96 75,48 5,88 2,91 3,93 1,62
Germany 11,56 7,80 59,98 5,21 1,90 7,49 6,07
Norway 0,56 1,10 87,91 2,96 1,84 1,65 3,96
UK 11,56 8,03 58,61 7,66 1,90 9,89 2,36
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (SR) US 16,42 6,95 4,57 60,54 4,87 1,07 5,58
Euro area 19,84 6,77 8,27 54,97 0,89 1,98 7,29
Japan 13,42 7,66 8,84 40,42 9,12 11,21 9,32
Canada 18,74 4,42 5,15 60,81 7,59 0,94 2,35
France 8,79 7,48 10,64 68,09 0,95 0,85 3,20
Italy 15,99 11,42 21,34 42,89 1,94 4,74 1,68
Germany 17,82 5,73 7,62 48,79 3,69 3,16 13,19
Norway 1,05 7,96 7,64 68,33 13,39 1,23 0,39
UK 5,68 6,98 2,59 75,44 1,95 2,74 4,62
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (LR) US 11,35 5,30 2,71 29,99 41,66 4,15 4,83
Euro area 9,79 11,43 5,97 12,83 50,33 2,12 7,53
Japan 6,81 12,49 1,56 9,18 63,17 3,54 3,27
Canada 6,48 4,54 6,17 27,76 50,01 1,56 3,49
France 6,44 11,33 12,51 17,89 47,06 2,71 2,06
Italy 5,74 11,11 2,53 14,51 57,06 6,86 2,19
Germany 10,63 10,85 2,45 14,91 55,88 2,59 2,70
Norway 4,53 7,84 4,75 2,76 76,19 2,26 1,67
UK 2,09 13,89 4,34 28,16 44,88 3,29 3,36
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (RW) US 5,65 9,65 26,45 9,20 8,68 34,90 5,48
Euro area 14,86 6,28 17,81 5,65 5,56 36,44 13,39
Japan 11,70 10,60 19,84 1,18 1,14 53,78 1,76
Canada 3,50 3,11 30,68 1,03 7,00 49,46 5,22
France 9,93 10,29 18,15 3,68 1,98 53,03 2,93
Italy 9,34 5,32 28,77 4,30 1,57 45,84 4,87
Germany 6,76 3,26 21,68 8,52 4,36 48,37 7,04
Norway 0,48 0,99 13,86 5,23 2,11 76,76 0,57
UK 18,65 7,36 17,90 8,93 3,12 41,50 2,55
Innovation in GDP o Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (REER) US 2,22 4,65 4,68 8,86 19,75 2,86 56,98
Euro area 3,34 6,42 8,83 3,09 4,06 3,20 71,06
Japan 6,31 1,03 2,85 6,60 5,69 7,11 70,41
Canada 4,97 4,01 14,79 17,06 2,16 0,70 56,30
France 1,36 3,06 4,81 4,57 7,48 1,82 76,91
Italy 2,53 2,04 6,52 3,80 5,82 1,00 78,29
Germany 3,77 6,85 4,61 9,60 4,77 3,87 66,52
Norway 3,15 4,70 9,85 2,34 7,84 3,81 68,31
UK 5,34 5,49 5,82 12,68 12,75 1,91 56,02
Note: This Table presents the results of the estimated variance decomposition at the 12-period horizon.
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Estimated Variance Decomposition at the 12-period horizon: Asymmetric Case
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (GDP) US 59,85 11,07 2,27 7,06 11,24 2,50 1,80 4,20
Euro area 64,86 11,36 - 4,10 9,14 1,44 5,35 3,75
Japan 74,89 2,50 - 3,53 2,96 2,99 5,63 7,49
Canada 56,35 4,05 2,62 8,92 18,20 4,68 1,23 3,96
France 77,17 7,96 - 2,65 7,26 0,36 1,15 3,45
Italy 64,82 9,09 - 1,33 3,95 0,44 17,41 2,97
Germany 77,87 4,88 - 3,63 4,08 4,10 4,45 1,00
Norway 78,54 3,74 - 0,97 5,13 1,18 6,21 4,23
UK 70,78 8,83 1,39 4,22 4,95 2,92 3,18 3,72
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (o
+)U S 7,40 66,82 1,27 3,35 4,79 4,05 2,40 9,92
Euro area 3,21 76,54 - 4,03 5,40 0,63 4,22 5,97
Japan 6,20 61,06 - 6,05 5,19 9,29 6,65 5,55
Canada 7,11 72,85 1,45 8,22 3,80 0,93 0,41 5,22
France 5,75 73,29 - 13,00 1,43 0,40 4,04 2,09
Italy 4,19 77,75 - 3,74 2,86 1,95 6,58 2,93
Germany 7,21 54,68 - 1,05 12,72 5,51 4,37 14,47
Norway 1,69 92,31 - 0,90 1,42 0,60 2,36 0,73
UK 16,52 64,52 0,55 1,07 6,28 2,58 4,90 3,58
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (o
-)U S 4,25 15,62 60,77 7,33 2,51 3,97 3,21 2,34
Canada 4,01 13,71 65,09 3,56 1,15 3,84 2,52 6,12
UK 5,99 14,14 62,14 6,15 1,94 1,95 2,23 5,45
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (Infl) US 6,02 7,12 6,03 51,55 9,55 10,18 5,22 4,33
Euro area 3,47 16,62 - 58,61 9,94 3,96 3,68 3,72
Japan 22,25 9,01 - 44,40 1,98 4,60 11,84 5,93
Canada 6,18 5,56 1,35 69,01 4,62 3,88 4,90 4,50
France 2,32 9,27 - 77,32 4,53 0,78 4,41 1,37
Italy 4,24 9,29 - 71,33 5,77 2,48 4,69 2,21
Germany 12,84 6,44 - 59,32 5,27 2,67 7,18 6,28
Norway 0,56 2,03 - 87,26 2,92 1,82 1,61 3,80
UK 11,96 9,12 1,63 56,98 7,65 1,31 8,23 3,12
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (SR) US 14,99 5,87 3,23 5,32 59,11 3,90 1,11 6,47
Euro area 15,22 9,79 - 9,20 55,20 1,76 2,58 6,24
Japan 13,76 6,74 - 8,31 42,08 10,43 9,84 8,85
Canada 18,76 4,64 1,09 4,63 59,91 7,34 0,72 2,91
France 8,41 6,44 - 11,64 68,85 1,10 0,68 2,86
Italy 15,35 10,45 - 21,34 43,20 2,17 5,23 2,26
Germany 13,95 12,83 - 7,66 43,19 4,35 3,17 14,86
Norway 1,02 9,30 - 7,12 66,53 14,17 1,56 0,29
UK 5,23 5,16 8,96 3,74 65,76 2,04 3,20 5,92
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (LR) US 11,12 3,20 4,93 2,34 30,57 37,66 4,54 5,64
Euro area 8,31 12,79 - 5,30 13,02 51,27 2,41 6,90
Japan 7,15 9,00 - 1,30 11,56 64,32 3,23 3,43
Canada 6,31 4,00 3,24 5,19 28,34 46,16 1,29 5,47
France 6,77 8,02 - 12,91 18,08 49,69 2,70 1,84
Italy 5,90 11,55 - 2,23 12,89 57,00 8,57 1,86
Germany 7,49 11,45 - 3,33 13,99 56,42 3,71 3,60
Norway 4,50 7,94 - 4,22 2,81 77,15 1,95 1,42
UK 5,94 15,04 5,35 5,42 20,79 40,07 3,16 4,22
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (RW) US 5,77 9,69 6,67 24,49 9,00 9,82 28,27 6,28
Euro area 13,33 8,02 - 17,86 5,54 4,60 36,69 13,98
Japan 11,23 15,50 - 19,92 1,14 1,25 49,10 1,86
Canada 3,70 3,02 6,35 31,26 1,20 6,05 42,83 5,60
France 9,79 9,55 - 18,68 3,96 2,64 51,04 4,34
Italy 8,49 7,76 - 27,83 4,09 1,58 46,88 3,37
Germany 7,87 3,79 - 17,98 10,00 4,35 48,14 7,87
Norway 0,41 3,29 - 13,10 4,24 2,85 75,54 0,57
UK 17,83 11,68 2,49 18,64 9,93 2,68 34,53 2,22
Innovation in GDP o
+ o
- Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (REER) US 3,10 6,01 3,99 3,33 8,10 16,70 3,16 55,59
Euro area 3,81 5,30 - 8,84 3,09 3,77 2,97 72,21
Japan 6,39 1,87 - 2,97 6,24 5,61 6,00 70,93
Canada 4,91 4,57 2,13 12,84 16,83 2,62 0,70 55,39
France 1,45 7,43 - 6,88 4,96 8,60 2,27 68,41
Italy 2,99 2,41 - 9,28 3,52 7,00 0,83 73,97
Germany 3,89 6,97 - 4,60 8,82 4,16 3,16 68,40
Norway 3,26 3,02 - 10,04 2,62 8,56 4,87 67,63
UK 7,42 5,88 3,29 6,38 9,28 10,62 2,49 54,65
Note: See remark below Table 8.A.
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Estimated Variance Decomposition at the 12-period horizon: Scaled Case
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (GDP) US 63,91 9,66 - 7,44 11,35 2,26 1,55 3,83
Euro area 63,07 11,49 - 4,81 9,55 1,63 5,77 3,67
Japan 74,13 2,90 - 3,29 3,07 3,29 5,87 7,45
Canada 54,56 2,95 3,41 9,47 18,30 5,50 1,30 4,51
France 76,50 8,03 - 3,09 7,09 0,45 1,16 3,67
Italy 63,60 9,86 - 1,27 3,41 0,36 18,32 3,17
Germany 77,10 4,85 - 3,55 4,54 4,39 4,63 0,95
Norway 78,36 4,11 - 0,88 5,08 1,16 6,17 4,22
UK 71,03 8,82 1,80 4,10 4,34 3,03 3,42 3,46
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (SOPI) US 6,35 69,73 - 3,92 3,71 3,25 3,37 9,67
Euro area 2,80 76,34 - 4,45 5,59 0,84 4,19 5,79
Japan 5,88 63,99 - 5,83 4,95 8,10 7,05 4,18
Canada 7,11 72,35 2,46 9,61 3,11 0,67 0,34 4,35
France 5,36 72,05 - 13,82 1,12 0,57 5,59 1,50
Italy 4,55 77,52 - 3,67 2,26 1,68 7,11 3,21
Germany 5,94 56,45 - 1,11 14,10 4,03 4,20 14,17
Norway 1,46 92,24 - 0,67 1,36 0,53 2,76 0,98
UK 16,57 63,64 2,35 1,34 5,32 2,63 5,06 3,08
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (SOPD) Canada 3,73 6,55 69,92 2,78 1,61 5,34 3,25 6,83
UK 3,20 9,46 68,84 7,76 2,47 1,27 1,78 5,23
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (Infl) US 7,05 5,22 - 57,31 9,53 10,84 6,08 3,97
Euro area 3,54 15,32 - 59,83 9,64 4,58 3,44 3,65
Japan 21,10 9,71 - 44,11 2,09 5,26 11,83 5,91
Canada 5,93 5,55 3,38 67,12 4,11 3,81 6,31 3,79
France 2,31 9,17 77,46 4,56 0,74 4,47 1,29
Italy 4,74 8,77 - 71,12 5,80 2,51 4,76 2,29
Germany 12,97 5,14 - 60,46 4,28 2,80 7,74 6,62
Norway 0,55 2,05 - 86,80 3,05 2,06 1,68 3,80
UK 12,64 8,72 1,36 57,03 7,25 1,61 8,54 2,85
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (SR) US 16,10 5,58 - 5,63 61,67 4,51 1,06 5,45
Euro area 13,79 10,28 - 9,67 55,07 2,40 2,87 5,92
Japan 13,68 5,31 - 8,53 42,83 10,71 10,20 8,74
Canada 19,31 4,42 1,08 4,52 59,86 7,25 0,89 2,67
France 8,01 5,48 - 12,37 69,00 1,32 0,65 3,15
Italy 16,03 11,72 - 19,15 42,47 2,11 5,91 2,61
Germany 12,68 13,63 - 6,54 44,85 4,50 3,42 14,38
Norway 1,06 10,05 - 7,12 65,38 14,51 1,60 0,28
UK 5,48 5,41 9,24 3,96 64,96 2,44 3,09 5,42
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (LR) US 12,94 2,99 - 3,41 30,89 40,84 4,57 4,36
Euro area 8,37 12,86 - 5,07 13,66 51,09 2,41 6,53
Japan 7,16 8,76 - 1,10 12,21 64,17 3,27 3,33
Canada 6,68 4,00 2,08 4,86 29,00 47,54 1,43 4,40
France 6,28 6,68 - 13,82 18,29 50,32 2,70 1,90
Italy 6,62 11,47 - 2,09 11,90 56,82 9,14 1,97
Germany 7,17 11,25 - 3,44 14,17 56,13 4,25 3,60
Norway 4,24 8,39 - 4,31 2,62 76,97 1,96 1,52
UK 5,10 17,26 4,73 5,54 20,34 40,17 2,96 3,91
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (RW) US 6,02 7,53 - 29,91 10,21 8,44 33,32 4,56
Euro area 12,89 8,28 - 19,19 5,38 4,55 35,61 14,10
Japan 10,26 14,63 - 21,42 1,06 1,32 49,48 1,83
Canada 2,97 3,65 3,87 32,28 0,97 7,12 44,17 4,96
France 10,49 8,78 - 19,05 3,96 2,77 50,31 4,64
Italy 8,76 7,10 - 27,90 3,88 1,51 47,25 3,60
Germany 7,70 3,30 - 18,39 8,86 4,33 49,52 7,91
Norway 0,36 4,04 - 12,83 4,30 3,18 74,71 0,58
UK 18,16 11,22 2,38 19,14 8,98 2,69 35,48 1,94
Innovation in GDP SOPI SOPD Infl SR LR RW REER
VAR (REER) US 2,57 4,97 - 4,29 8,97 19,32 3,09 56,79
Euro area 3,88 5,07 - 9,50 3,02 3,55 2,87 72,11
Japan 6,31 1,86 - 3,26 6,77 5,69 6,01 70,10
Canada 5,42 4,61 2,16 12,26 16,28 2,42 0,79 56,07
France 1,46 7,45 - 7,52 4,75 8,25 2,54 68,01
Italy 2,90 2,54 - 9,42 3,35 6,85 0,85 74,09
Germany 3,75 7,22 - 4,44 9,07 4,73 3,09 67,72
Norway 3,25 3,08 - 9,28 2,66 8,19 5,04 68,51
UK 7,04 5,23 4,96 7,22 9,35 11,65 2,79 51,77
Note: See remark below Table 8.A.
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